Does Molinism teach that God's sovereignty is trumped by Free Will?

Turretinfan says yes.

Wes Widner states: "Middle Knowledge (and William Lane Craig in particular) does not teach that God's sovereignty is trumped or determined by man's free will or by God's Middle Knowledge of man's free will."

Yes, it does. Consider Craig's claim:

What I am simply saying is that God's aims in this life, in this world, are for a maximum number of people to come to know God and His salvation as fully as possible. And it is possible that that would not be achieved in a world that did not involve as much suffering and evil as this world does. Far from being counter-intuitive, I find that very plausible.(source)

That's at least a conditional trumping claim. There's no claim that God is required to create, but if he does, and if he creates free will beings, and if he wishes to save the maximum number of people (as Craig insists), he is restricted to actualizing worlds in which their is suffering and evil on account of the free will of the creatures. (link)

Turretinfan is either using his own specialized definition of sovereignty; which includes causal determinism and begs the question against Molinism, or his argument falls short of substantiating his claims.

Sovereignty is about authority. Normally, being sovereign over another person does not mean you causally predetermine their actions, rather it means you are their ruler and have the right to command them to do something and punish them if they don't do it. In Molinism, God is absolutely sovereign.

Turretinfan continues:

Wes Widner also states: "It is disingenuous to claim that Molinism is a philosophy whereas causal determinism isn't."

That's a mischaracterization of the situation. Molinism is merely philosophical. Causal determinism oozes from Scripture. It is provable from Scripture - making it a Biblical, and not merely a philosophical, position. Of course, causal determinism is a metaphysical claim.

Most of the classical text on the providence of God (passages like Acts 4:28) entail either Molinism or Determinism. Why does Turretinfan favor determinism over Molinism in explaining such passages?

Turretinfan, if your game, pick three text you think teach (implicitly or explicitly) causal determinism and preclude Molinism and I will take a shot at explaining them.

Friday Files: Watson on Omniscience

Richard Watson's article on Omniscience (a part of his systematic theology) discusses God's knowledge and foreknowledge. Watson starts out by providing the scriptural passages indicating that God's knowledge is infinite. He then provides arguments from reason supporting God's infinite knowledge; namely, from God's being the First Cause, from His wisdom displayed in His works and finally from Greek philosophers who conclude God is omniscient based on the light of nature and express themselves well, so long as they expressed themselves generally, on
this subject.

Next Watson takes on the idea that God does not know our future choices; either because He doesn't choose to or because such foreknowledge implies a contradiction. Watson destroys this idea with scripture on prophecies of future choices and demonstrates what damage this does to God's providence.

Then Watson reconciles God's foreknowledge with human freedom by pointing out the difference between certainty and necessity (i.e. that a thing will happen vs. it must happen). Watson points out that knowledge is not the cause of a thing known, so if something is making that thing necessary, it's not God's knowledge.

One of the ways people have attempted to reconcile God's foreknowledge with human freedom is to deny that God's foreknowledge and our knowledge are similar in nature. Watson does not like this approach. While God's knowledge is infinite and ours is finite; the nature of the knowledge is the same. Likewise, God's goodness is infinite and He is an infinite Spirit and our goodness and spirit are finite, yet they have the same nature. Finally, Watson denies that God is impassive, while maintaining God's immutability, by removing from His emotions all the imperfections that are attached and commingled with our emotions.

Watson wraps up the discussion of God's foreknowledge by noting: the question is not, how to reconcile God's prescience with the freedom of man; but how to reconcile the conduct of God toward man, considered as a free agent, with his own prescience; how to assign a congruity
to warnings, exhortations, and other means adopted to prevent destruction as to individuals, with the certain foresight of that terrible result. But Watson insists that in permitting sin, no moral attribute of God is impugned.

In an interesting footnote discussion of middle knowledge, Watson quotes Curcellaeus who states Gomarus (Arminius' opponent) used middle knowledge with respect to the fall (and only the fall), to avoid the idea that God is the author of sin.

Luke's Use of Pluperfects of Completed Action

Turretinfan responded to my comments on Acts 13:48:

However, Dan unfortunately seems to have misunderstood how the timing is indicated by the context. In this case, the reference timing is the time when the Gentiles, heard the gospel message, were glad, glorified the word of the Lord, and believed. The pluperfect indicates an action that was "past" with respect to those events.

That means that the ordaining was done before hearing, the being glad, the glorifying, and the believing. That does not necessarily specify when exactly the ordaining was done, which is a point that Dr. White tried to emphasize.

If we only had this verse we could not say whether the ordaining had been done (notice my own use of the pluperfect) in eternity past, a week before the message was preached, or five minutes before the apostle spoke. (link) Emphasis mine.

Acts 13:48 states: And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord: and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.

In my understanding of Acts 13:48: I peg the timing of tazzo-ing (ordaining) to the context (either the Gentiles hearing of the gospel or the Gentiles hearing that the gospel applied to them). On the other hand, Turretinfan pegs it to something outside the context (predestination from before the foundation of the world). In doing so, note that Turretinfan denies that pluperfects of completed action are complete at a time implied in the context or at a specified time. But this contradicts standard Greek grammars:

The Pluperfect of Completed Action. The Pluperfect is used of an action which was complete at a point of past time implied in the context. (Burton)

The Pluperfect represents an action as already finished at some specified past time (Goodwin)

Turretinfan seeks an unspecified past time - one not implied in the context. This further contradicts Luke's usage. Here are all Luke's pluperfects of completed action (Acts 13:48 excepted). Note that all cases the timing of the past time is implied in the context.


Luke 2:49 But 1 he replied, 2 “Why were you looking for me? 3 Didn’t you know that I must be in my Father’s house?”
Luk 4:41 Demons also came out 1 of many, crying out, 2 “You are the Son of God!” 3 But he rebuked 4 them, and would not allow them to speak, 5 because they knew that he was the Christ.
Luk 6:8 But 1 he knew 2 their thoughts, 3 and said to the man who had the withered hand, “Get up and stand here.” 4 So 5 he rose and stood there.
Luk 8:2 and also some women 1 who had been healed of evil spirits and disabilities: 2 Mary 3 (called Magdalene), from whom seven demons had gone out,
Luk 8:29 For Jesus 1 had started commanding 2 the evil 3 spirit to come out of the man. (For it had seized him many times, so 4 he would be bound with chains and shackles 5 and kept under guard. But 6 he would break the restraints and be driven by the demon into deserted 7 places.)
Luk 8:35 So 1 the people went out to see what had happened, and they came to Jesus. They 2 found the man from whom the demons had gone out, sitting at Jesus’ feet, clothed and in his right mind, and they were afraid.
Luk 8:38 The man from whom the demons had gone out begged to go 1 with him, but Jesus 2 sent him away, saying,
Luk 19:22 The king 1 said to him, ‘I will judge you by your own words, 2 you wicked slave! 3 So you knew, did you, that I was a severe 4 man, withdrawing what I didn’t deposit and reaping what I didn’t sow?
Luk 23:35 The people also stood there watching, but the rulers ridiculed 1 him, saying, “He saved others. Let him save 2 himself if 3 he is the Christ 4 of God, his chosen one!”
Luk 23:49 And all those who knew Jesus 1 stood at a distance, and the women who had followed him from Galilee saw 2 these things.
Act 1:10 As 1 they were still staring into the sky while he was going, suddenly 2 two men in white clothing stood near them
Act 4:22 For the man, on whom this miraculous sign 1 of healing had been performed, 2 was over forty years old.
Act 7:18 until another king who did not know about 1 Joseph ruled 2 over Egypt. 3
Act 7:44 Our ancestors 1 had the tabernacle 2 of testimony in the wilderness, 3 just as God 4 who spoke to Moses ordered him 5 to make it according to the design he had seen.
Act 8:27 So 1 he got up 2 and went. There 3 he met 4 an Ethiopian eunuch, 5 a court official of Candace, 6 queen of the Ethiopians, who was in charge of all her treasury. He 7 had come to Jerusalem to worship, 8
Act 9:7 (Now the men 1 who were traveling with him stood there speechless, 2 because they heard the voice but saw no one.) 3
Act 9:21 All 1 who heard him were amazed and were saying, “Is this not 2 the man who in Jerusalem was ravaging 3 those who call on this name, and who had come here to bring them as prisoners 4 to the chief priests?”
Act 12:9 Peter 1 went out 2 and followed him; 3 he did not realize that what was happening through the angel was real, 4 but thought he was seeing a vision.
Act 14:23 When they had appointed elders 1 for them in the various churches, 2 with prayer and fasting 3 they entrusted them to the protection 4 of the Lord in whom they had believed.
Act 14:8 In 1 Lystra 2 sat a man who could not use his feet, 3 lame from birth, 4 who had never walked.
Act 16:3 Paul wanted Timothy 1 to accompany him, and he took 2 him and circumcised 3 him because of the Jews who were in those places, 4 for they all knew that his father was Greek. 5
Act 19:32 So then some were shouting one thing, some another, for the assembly was in confusion, and most of them did not know why they had met together. 1
Act 20:38 especially saddened 1 by what 2 he had said, that they were not going to see him 3 again. Then they accompanied 4 him to the ship.
Act 21:18 The next day Paul went in with us to see James, and all the elders were there. 1
Act 21:26 Then Paul took the men the next day, 1 and after he had purified himself 2 along with them, he went to the temple and gave notice 3 of the completion of the days of purification, 4 when 5 the sacrifice would be offered for each 6 of them.
Act 23:5 Paul replied, 1 “I did not realize, 2 brothers, that he was the high priest, for it is written, ‘You must not speak evil about a ruler of your people.’”

Now of course, Turretinfan (and James White) could backpedal and deny that Acts 13:48 is a pluperfect of completed action and instead claim it's some other kind of pluperfect. But pluperfects of completed action require completion within the context, not outside the context.

Goals of this Blog

RGMPilgrim’s recent comments challenged me to think about the purpose of this blog.
Here’s the comment:

I think that Calvinism is as diabolical as it was for Calvin to have a man killed in the name of religious convictions.The servant of the Lord must not strive but be gentle unto all men was not Calvin's motto I do not think. On the other hand Jude made clear that there is something which we must "earnestly contend" for. It is the faith that JESUS Christ presented to us, and that faith did NOT include an option at thinking that God has not revealed whom he would elect, does it? Jesus is the revelation of the Father and Jesus was a first class gentleman, until he met up with the temple priest/businessmen.Further does not that faith for which we "agonizo" preclude that those who call God's wisdom arbitriness and God's justice, non-justice are to be viewed as "un-godly" and as servants of the Enemy?Perhaps you should beware being too "harmless?" This is war, albeit war in a spiritual theatre.Stay armed and stand my brother! :-) Roy

I never have put too much weight on Calvin's episode with Servitus, since it doesn't falsify Calvinism. Also, although killing Servitus goes against my understanding of the scriptures on the issue of church and state; I will admit I don't find the issue 100% clear, so I am not that dogmatic about it.

But it's the second part, viewing Calvinism as an enemy in a war that really got me thinking. The two main reason I strive to take a moderate approach to Calvinism are 1) I have always thought that Calvinism is inconsistent rather than blasphemous (i.e. it leads to God's authorship of sin, but they deny it) and 2) my past attempts of viewing Calvinism/Arminianism as a war lead me into great temptations to sin.

So if I am not trying to win a war, what is my goal? Reconciliation. I understand that hard-line Calvinists are unlikely to give up their Calvinism. And yet, while I am happy to provide information to those making up their minds about the issue; the rigorous fully thought out model of Calvinism of hard-line Calvinists provides for clearer discussion. So my goal of reconciliation seems impractical and may not be accomplished in my lifetime or even on this world. Still as a consolidation prise, I would like to at least lay out the foundations of a system that I think 'meets in the middle' that may be of some use in a time when reconciliation seems more likely. I think middle knowledge will be very useful in this regard.

James White's Response on Molinism

Dr. White graciously took the time to respond to one of my posts where I commented on his critique of middle knowledge. (link) The discussion is in the first part of the broadcast. I had argued that Dr. White's positions that Molinism undermines both LFW and God's sovereignty were inconsistent. Dr. White responds that I misrepresented his arguments and it's possible for a system to have more than one problem.

It's true that I didn't quote Dr. White's comments in their entirety, but I did link to them. But what I did say I believe to be both relevant and accurate. As for systems being able to have more than one problem; I agree. But only if you draw out contradictory premises from inside a system, can you validly assert a contradiction. If one or both of the premises are unacceptable to your opponent and outside their system; they have every right to point out that your assertions are inconsistent. Thus Mark notes about Christ's trial: many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not together. (Mark 14:56)

To explain my position (that Dr. White's arguments are inconsistent) I plan to summarize his arguments and draw out the contradiction.

Dr. White's Arguments

Argument #1 - Molinism Undermines LFW
P1: Molinism says God knows what you would do under any circumstance
P2: In any given circumstance, people can only do what God knew they would do
P3: Libertarian free will requires the person to be able to choose A or non-A
C1: So Molinism undermines LFW


Argument #2 - Molinism Undermines God's Sovereignty
P4: Molinism says God knows what you would do under any circumstance
P5: In any given circumstance, our hypothetical free choices limit God's options
P6: God's sovereingy is inconsistent with anything outside of God limiting His options
C2: So Molinism undermines God's sovereignty


P2 is 'external' to Molinism; an idea introduced by James White. Molina himself said the opposite explicitly and repeatedly.¹ P2 and P5 imply a contradiction; that we are only able to do one thing and at the same time our ability to do two things limits God's options. One possibility and twofold possibilities... 1=2. A plain contradiction.

If our nature was such that we only had the ability to do one thing (i.e. if we don't have twofold possibilities), then what we do is necessary such that we cannot do otherwise. Necessary items are a part of God's natural knowledge, not His middle knowledge - the very idea of middle knowledge is based on twofold possibilities and yes, God's choice to give us twofold possibilities limited His options.

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¹For the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not going to happen because they are foreknown by God as going to happen, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our freedom of choice – through if they were going to happen in a contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way the are in fact foreknown as going to happen – and, indeed the knowledge by which God knew absolutely that such and such things would come to be is not a cause of the things, but rather, once the order of things that we see has been posited by the free determination of the divine will, then (as Origen and the other Fathers observe) the effects will issue forth from their causes – naturally from natural causes, freely and contingently with respect to both parts from free causes – just as if God had no foreknowledge of future events. From this it clearly follows that no prejudice at all is done to freedom of choice or to the contingency of things by God’s foreknowledge, aforeknowledge through which, because of the infinity and wholly unlimited perfection and acumen of His intellect, He sees with certainty what the free causes placed in any order of things will do, even though they could really, if they so willed do the contrary; rather, even though that knowledge exists, freedom of choice and the contingency of things with respect to both parts remains intact, just as if there were no foreknowledge. (Molina Translation by Freddoso. Concordia Disp 52 para 29.)

White on Molinism

James White discussed Molinism on a recent dividing line. (link) His two primary criticisms of middle knowledge (God's know what you would do under any circumstances) were 1) it doesn't accomplish God's goal of giving man freewill, which makes man robots and doesn't escape unconditional election and 2) middle knowledge removes God's sovereignty and places too much in the hands of man's autonomous freewill, thereby limiting what God can do with His creation and robbing God of His glory. Awkwardly for Dr. White, sometimes he would raise both objections in the same train of thought - seemingly unaware of how at odds these to claims are to each other. Both cannot be problems at the same time. Nor were his objections based on two distinct aspects of Molinism; they were both based directly on the idea that God knows what you would do under any circumstances. It's odd that those objecting to Molinism's consistency use such inconsistent approaches such as this.

Friday Files: McCant's A Wesleyan Interpretation of Romans 5-8

Jerry McCant's Interpretation of Romans 5-8 is in response to a request to provide a Wesleyan view of Romans 6-8. He expands the scope to cover chapter 5, since he finds a close connection between 5 and 6. While I personally didn't like McCant's not finding original sin in Romans 5 or his saying Paul's analogies in Romans 6 & 7 have problems, McCant does make some interesting points. Overall, McCant does not find a Wesleyan 'second work of grace' in the passage.

Another Impact of Arminius on Calvinism

My recent post about Arminius' impact on Calvinism drew criticisms from Turretinfan and Steve Hays. (link) TF suggests one could read my article and come to the conclusion that Arminius was a infralapsarian. I am not sure how that could be, given I said Dort condemned Arminianism.

Steve wonders if I think Arminius originated some ideas that impacted Calvinism, but I had said "Arminius didn't teach anything new". Origination of the ideas isn't the only way to impact an outcome. Piscator fought tooth and nail to keep the 'well meant' offer out of the confession, at one point saying he would count the rest of the synodists as Remonstrants if he didn't get his way on the issue, but in the end he as overruled. (Womock. Calvinist Cabinet Unlocked. 94) It's important that the issue turned out this way rather than that, and Arminius got attention on the issue by point out the drawbacks of denying a well meant offer.

TF said "When the Westminster Assembly (still later) adopted their confession and catechisms they were actually more careful (I'd say) to avoid making the Supra/Infra distinction a confessional matter."

Dort debated the issue of infra/supra. Gomarus championed the supra side, along with at least Piscator, Festus Hominmius, Henricus Aroldi, Baltazar Lydius and Gisbertus Voetius (Acts of National Synod of Dort. Part 1. 233) . The synod choose their wording on this issue carefully.

But TF's comment about the 'openness' of the WCF reminders me of another point. TF notes well the WCF is open to supra, but WCF is also open to unlimited atonement. It was written such that both 5 point Calvinists and 4 pointers would be satisfied. TF himself has noted Arminius' influence on Amyraldianism. So that's another way in which Arminius impacted Calvinism. (I didn't note this in my first post, because Arminius' influence here was certainly far more remote.)

Arminius' Impact on Calvinism

Arminius didn't teach anything new, but his shoulders were strong enough to carry the cause of the many non-Calvinist Protestants of his day. While his influence on non-Calvinists was the strongest, I did want to point out on this the 400th anniversary of his death, his influence on Calvinism.

As those familiar with Arminius know, his primary issue with Calvinism was supra-lapsarianism - the idea that the decree of unconditional election logically precedes the decree of the fall. In supra-lapsarianism, God uses the fall as a means of coming up with the end. It's like planning a trip. First you set the destination, then you plan the route. In supra-lapsarianism, God first decides who to glorify and who to destroy, then He plans for man to fall so they will need salvation and punishment in Hell.

Arminius' writings against the supra-lapsarians Perkins and Gomorus focused on that issue, as did his commentary on Romans 9 and his declaration of sentiments. Sub-lapsarianism is treated as an after thought and dismissed as inconsistent. Even his dialogue with the sub-lapsarian Junius was spent on demonstrating that supra-lapsarians went 'that far'. If there hadn't been supra-lapsarianism, I doubt there would have been an Arminius.

How did Arminius' efforts against supra-lapsarianism impact Calvinism? The Canons of Dort are sub-lapsarian, not supra-lapsarian. From the Canons of Dort: Before the foundation of the world, by sheer grace, according to the free good pleasure of his will, he chose in Christ to salvation a definite number of particular people out of the entire human race, which had fallen by its own fault from its original innocence into sin and ruin. Those chosen were neither better nor more deserving than the others, but lay with them in the common misery.... those, that is, concerning whom God, on the basis of his entirely free, most just, irreproachable, and unchangeable good pleasure, made the following decision: to leave them in the common misery into which, by their own fault, they have plunged themselves; not to grant them saving faith and the grace of conversion; but finally to condemn and eternally punish them (having been left in their own ways and under his just judgment), not only for their unbelief but also for all their other sins, in order to display his justice. (link)

Arminius pointed out enough problems with supra-lapsarianism and got enough attention on the issue, that the synod moved away from supra-lapsarianism. No doubt, Arminius' role was contributory rather than individually decisive, but then again, Arminius is best seen as the 'point of the spear' in non-Calvinism, rather than a rogue elephant.

Additionally, Dort adopted Arminus' language regarding a serious call. Here's what Arminius said: Whomsoever God calls, he calls them seriously, with a will desirous of their repentance and salvation. (Works of James Arminius) Here's were Dort picked up the same language: Nevertheless, all who are called through the gospel are called seriously. For seriously and most genuinely God makes known in his Word what is pleasing to him: that those who are called should come to him. Seriously he also promises rest for their souls and eternal life to all who come to him and believe. (Dort)

Finally, Arminius and Dort agreed that God is not the author of sin.

Based on Dort's affirming sub-lapsarianism and a 'well meant' offer of the gospel and denying God is the author of sin, the issue with Calvinism today is consistency rather than blasphemy. What a vital contribution to Calvinism! No doubt, I am seeing the thin silver lining on a huge gray cloud, since Dort condemned Arminianism, but it's good to know the bulk of Arminius' work was not lost on Calvinists.

Friday Files: Cottrell "Sovereignty and Free Will"

In Jack Cottrell's article, Sovereignty and Free Will, he discusses the question: is there a logical incompatibility between the sovereignty of God and the free will of man? He points out that every detail may be included in God's decree without everything's being determined or effectuated by God. God decided to give man freedom; God has sovereignly and absolutely determined man's freedom, but not man's free acts. This is the way he planned it, decreed it, created it. God is in control, in that he is the creator and sustainer of all and that God controls the external circumstances of a man through his divine providence and he works within the heart through the Holy Spirit, but not to the point that man is left without choice. God works even to the point of opening or hardening the heart, yet without turning the will itself to one side or the other and always within the frame work of His foreknowledge.

Friday Files: Dunn, A DISCOURSE ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

In Dunn's article, A Discourse on the Freedom of the Will he dispatches Jonathan Edwards two main arguments in a quick and decisive manor. He responses to Edwards' cause of a volition dilemma (infinite regression of causes or causeless cause) by pointing out that Edwards begs the question regarding the definition and nature of causes and that his argument undermines God's freedom. Following Edwards' principles, Dunn argues: therefore there never was a divine volition without a pre-existing motive. Hence there was a time when there was no force in the universe, but the force of motive; and when there either was no God, or else no active God. If we take one horn of the dilemma, and say there was a God, but a God without volition, and consequently without activity or character, we have the Pantheist's God. If we take the other, and affirm that previous to volition there was no intelligent God, we have the God of the Atheist. In either case, the universe presents but a vast blind machine, driven by fate through the immensity ,of space and duration.

Dunn counters Edwards claim that Calvinism explains how God knows the future and Arminianism does not, by stating God is infinite, filling all space, and even filling all duration, there, can be no object or evidence between him and the object or fact known. God knows the future directly, not indirectly by way of predetermining it or any other mediating factor.

Dunn also address the practical implications of Calvinism, point out that is it not universally known, that in their efforts for changing the hearts and characters of men--for promoting morality and religion, they leave entirely out of sight their peculiar views upon this question, and address themselves to common sense and common consciousness... Does not this fact go to show most conclusively, that our opponents themselves have no confidence in the practical influence of their doctrine, and especially when any great practical interest is at stake?

I thought this articles was fabulous!

One of James White's Criticisms of Molinism

Often James White points out that Molinism came from the Jesuits, whose founder, Ignatius of Loyola, was on a mission to combat Protestantism in general and the denial of free will in particular. While Molinism has some roots in the church fathers and the scholastics of the middle ages, it certainly was was first articulated and systematized using the scholastic method by the Jesuits. So while White's intent seems to be 'poisoning the well', his claims seem to have some basis. Should this be a concern for Molinists? I don't think so; what's interesting here is not Ignatius' intention but rather his method. Ignatius attempted to strengthen Catholic countries via education, so he help found schools and universities. Molinism is the result of intense study and serious reflection upon the issues related the God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The three early Jesuits most commonly associated with Molinism, Molina, Bellarmine and Suarez, were all unquestionably highly educated and bright. While reading Suarez, it's hard to not get the impression that the man read everything and I haven't seen a painting of him, I picture him as having an enormous egg where most people have a head. So throwing out Molinism because of it's association with Jesuits is a mistake for those who take education seriously.

Friday Files: Vance A CRITIQUE OF THE POTTER’S FREEDOM

Laurence Vance's article A CRITIQUE OF THE POTTER’S FREEDOM by James White identifies, catalogues and handles White's rhetoric in favor of Calvinism. While the focus of the article is on rhetoric, Vance does make some incisive points. First, in some circles Baptist Calvinists are seen as only second-class Calvinists. Second, the fact that God is sovereign is obvious. If God was not sovereign he would not be God. The rulers of many countries have absolute sovereignty, but that does not mean they are holy or even good. The important
thing about God is that he is sovereign yet holy.

Friday Files: S. M. BAUGH AND THE MEANING OF FOREKNOWLEDGE: ANOTHER LOOK

Tom McCall and Keith Stanglin's article S. M. BAUGH AND THE MEANING OF FOREKNOWLEDGE: ANOTHER LOOK reviews Baugh's arguments that the meaning of foreknowledge in the NT renders "impossible" the "Arminian notion of 'foreseen faith'. Tom and Keith do a good job pointing out that Baugh assumes the irreconcilability of foreknowledge and free will from the outset (without arguing the point) and also that Baugh's view is contrary to the teachings of the early church. Unfortunately, the online article is incomplete and I couldn't find the rest of it via google, but what I read was interesting.

Friday Files: Hamilton - The Order of Faith and Election in John's Gospel

Robert Hamilton makes a very good case that passages such as John 10:26 'you do not believe, because you are not my sheep' refers primarily to the faithful sons of Abraham who were God’s children under the covenant as it was revealed in the Old Testament, and who were already prepared by their voluntary faith and repentance to embrace the promised Messiah. (link)

Hamilton starts out by distinguishing between necessary and sufficient conditions for salvation in the Gospel of John. First, there are the necessary conditions of being “enabled” to come to Christ and being “drawn” to him by the Father (6:44, 65). Necessary conditions are signaled in the passages above by the grammatical structure “No one can . . . unless . . .” Second, we find in the above passages from John’s Gospel the sufficient conditions of being “given” to Jesus by the Father, having “listened to” and “learned from” the Father, “belonging” to God (i.e., being his child, cf. the contrast to the children of the devil in 8:44), and being one of Jesus’ “sheep” (6:37, 45; 8:47; 10:26, 29; 17:6, 9, 24). Sufficient conditions are generally signaled by phrases such as “Everyone who . . .” (6:45; Greek pas ho . . .) or “All that . . . will . . .” (6:37; Greek pan ho . . .), indicating that every person without exception who meets the relevant conditions will experience the result entailed by those conditions. The focus of Hamilton's essay are the passages addressing the sufficient conditions for salvation.

Hamilton pours through the scriptures in explaining that in the OT the nation of Israel were God's 'people' and His 'sheep' and His 'children'. In another more restrictive sense those who are in a right covenant relationship with God are His people, sheep and children, and that covenant relationship is conditional based on repentance and faith. Also, John the Baptist makes ready a people prepared for the Lord. So the Gospel of John deals with Jews who had responded favorably to the prevenient grace extended to them by God under the covenant as it was revealed in the Old Testament. Hamilton also explains they had already made the free choice to be “on the side of truth” (18:37) and to yield themselves in repentance and loyalty to God. Consequently, God could, by the inner working of his Holy Spirit in their hearts, direct all of these faithful ones who already belonged to him to embrace Jesus, the Messiah-Shepherd, as the new focal-point of their faith and loyalty.

This demonstrates one of the main themes of the Gospel of John, the union between the Father and the Son, by answering and important doubt: did the leaders’ rejection of Jesus indicate that he was, in fact, not sent from God to shepherd the flock of Israel? On the contrary, Christ is the Father’s sole aim in the dispensing of prevenient grace.

Hamilton also touches on how this idea relates to the gentiles, Acts 13:48, Cornelius and a number of other texts in the Gospel of John.

Book Review: Rowe - Can God be Free?

William Rowe's book asks the question: Can God be Free? First, he gives an interesting historical introduction to the subject covering the views of Gottfried Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Aquinas, and Jonathan Edwards; meanwhile he chimes in with his critique of their views from time to time. Then he discusses more recent treatments, such as Adams, Kretzmann, Howard-Snyder, Morris, Hasker, Wainwright, Langtry, Menssen, Wierenga, Flint, Swinburne, and Talbott. Rowe seems to hold that libertarian freedom is necessary for responsibility and he dismisses compatiblism as 'language gone on holiday'. Based on Leibniz's argument that God must have created the best of all possible worlds, Rowe argues a forking maneuver: either creation was necessary and God is not praiseworthy or God doesn't exist.

Historic Overview

Leibniz articulated two ideas that vital to the discussion. The first is the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which states: there ought to be a reason why things should be so, and not otherwise (9). Both Clarke and Leibniz affirmed this principle in their debate, but Clarke meant something other than Leibniz did and Leibniz questioned if Clarke clearly understood it. Clarke indicated that sometimes "the mere will of God" is the only sufficient reason; providing the example of God's choice to create the universe here and not some other part of absolute space (Clarke was a Neutonian in physics) (11). Leibniz saw this move as bootstrapped. Leibniz's second idea was the Principle of Best: God never prefers the less perfect to the more perfect (20). Leibniz notes God is bound by moral necessity, to make things in such a manner that there can be nothing better: otherwise... he would not be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for its imperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divine nature (17). This immediately threatens God's libertarian free will. Rowe gives the example of God thinking about creating a good world or a bad world. To say that God freely created the good world seems to imply that he was free not to do so, that he could have created the inferior world, or refrained from creating either world. But if his perfect goodness requires him to create the good world, how is it possible that he was free to create the inferior world or not to create any world? (13) Leibniz suggests a compatiblist solution; the distinction between moral and natural necessity corresponding to the distinction between certainty and necessity. Thus it was certain that God create the good world, but not necessary that He do so. Rowe rejects Leibniz's solution as inconsistent, given Leibniz's principles.

Next Rowe reviews Leibniz's libertarian opponent, Samuel Clarke. Clarke held God is unable to sin but he also holds God is all powerful. He reconciles the two by saying "it is no diminution of power not to be able to do things which are no object of power. And it is in like manner no diminution either of power or liberty to have such a perfect and unalterable rectitude of will as never possibly to choose to do anything inconsistent with that rectitude. (30) Rowe points out that while this doesn't diminish God's power, it does diminish God's freedom; God is not free to sin. Then he extends this idea to God's goodness and creating the best possible world and concludes God is not free to create other worlds.

Then Rowe reviews Thomas Aquinas. Rowe claims Aquinas held God necessarily wills His own goodness and God necessarily had to create some world to share or diffuse His own goodness. While it's true Aquinas taught God necessarily wills His own goodness, Aquinas explicitly denied creation was necessary. Aquinas states: "God, therefore, can will the non-existence of anything whatever apart from Himself. Hence, it is not of necessity that things other than Himself exist." (Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1 Chapter 81 - THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL OTHER THINGS IN A NECESSARY WAY) Rowe seems mislead on this point by Aquinas' statement: "Moreover, the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each thing is its act and perfection. Now, each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s perfection that it “can produce its like,” as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV [3]. Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God because, as we have shown above, being through Himself the necessary being, God is the cause of being for other things. God is, therefore, truly good." (Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1 Chapter 37 ) Commenting on this text, Rowe states: "The difficulty with viewing God's creation of some world or other as a free act is that God's goodness is a necessary aspect of his nature, and if goodness is necessarily 'diffusive of itself' then it would seem to be necessary that God express his goodness in crating some world or another." (37) But Aquinas isn't saying goodness is necessarily diffusive of itself. He's saying God can and did diffuse goodness. In other words, when God created the world and said "it is good", this is evidence that God is good.

Aquinas also said there is no 'best world'; rather there are an infinite number of possible worlds. From this, Rowe concludes that Aquinas taught there is an infinitely increasing number of better and better possible worlds without reaching a 'best'. I am not sure if this is necessary conclusion or not; there could be an infinite number of equivalently good worlds. But in any case this view becomes Rowe's main opposition throughout the rest of his book.

Rowe concludes his review of the history of the issue with Jonathan Edwards. Edwards taught that God's creation of this world was necessary, given God's nature, but still maintained God created it freely (link). Edwards used compatibilism to reconcile the apparent discrepancy. He distinguished between the power to do something and the power to will to do something; which led him to distinguish between natural and moral inability. Edwards asserted we had the power to do otherwise if we willed to, but not the power to will to. (59) Rowe combats this notion based on moral intuitions and case law involving the ability to choose otherwise.

Contemporary Overview

Rowe then moves into more recent discussion of the issue of God's freedom. Robert Adams argued that it wouldn't be immoral for God to create a less than optimal world because no one is harmed in the process. Those not created are unharmed, because they don't exist. Those created are better off existing than not existing. (80) Rowe counters that perhaps God is not morally obligated to create the best world, but doing so is a supererogatory act - a good act beyond the call of duty. (82) Adams argues that God's love is unconditional; not based on the merits of the one loved, so God's choice can't be based on the best possible creation. (83) Rowe objects that then love is not the reason God creates this or that world.

Rowe posits: If an omniscient being creates a world where there is a better world that it could have created, then it is possible that there exists a being morally better than it. (91) So in the scenario with an infinite number of increasingly better worlds with none being best, if God creates world 100 and could have created 101, it is possible there exists a being morally better than God. Howerd-Snyder counters that any being led by such a principle is irrational and hence not omniscient, nor would he ever create, given for each world there is one better. (94) Rowe counters that within a segment of infinity, say worlds 100 to 200, if God creates world 150 then it's possible that a being morally better than God would have create a world higher than 150. Wierenga counters that God rejected an infinite number of worse worlds and an infinite number of better worlds. That's true if God creates 150, 175 or 200. It's impossible for God to create a world with none better and therefore God is not obligated to do so. (135) In a revealing response, Rowe objects that the incremental difference between 175 and 174 is the same, but once you get to one, the increment decreases. Thus you go from 1 to 1/2 to 1/4 and so forth. Ultimately, there is no appreciable, felt difference to any sentient being. (136) Further, this view amounts to saying "God is free only when it does not matter what he does". (140)

Rowe concludes his review of the contemporary debate by rejecting Talbott's compatiblistic solution as 'language gone on holiday'. (149) Rowe concludes the book by giving his theistic opponents two options; it doesn't matter which world God creates or God necessarily created the world he did.

My Reactions

Scripture plainly asserts God has both ultimate responsibility (Genesis 1:1) and alternative possibilities (Matthew 3:9, Matthew 26:53, Ephesians 3:20). When something leaves the hand of the Creator, it is and must be good ( Genesis 1:31) but we, via our own freedom, can make ourselves worse off (2 Peter 2:21, Matthew 26:24). God's asseity means He does not need us for His blessedness (Romans 9:5) but our blessedness is contingent (Matthew 5:1-10). So from the perspective of God's blessedness , goodness, holiness and justice all worlds are equivalent, but from the perspective of our blessedness, there is an infinity of increasingly better worlds with none best. We could be better off, but God could not.

I think the idea that God chose to create the best possible world is self-contradictory. If God can't create a world, it's not a possible world. It's not causally possible, because God can't create it. It's not logically possible because God's creating the world implies the contradiction of a unwise, all wise God. Something would have to be as good as God for God to have to create it, which is impossible. Ultimately, the idea that God had to create this world ascribes to creation what belongs to the Creator and undermines God's sovereignty, in that God's not in control, His holiness in that He had to create evil and His omnipotence in that He can't do anything other than what has and will happen. So for me, Leibniz's idea is off the table.

When pressed by Adams and Wierenga, who basically question Rowe's standard for defining 'best' or his scales for judging God's morality, Rowe retreats from his argument that 'possibly there exists a being morally better than God' to 'it doesn't matter which world God creates'. This contradicts his holding to libertarian freedom and accepting agent causation. How is agent causation satisfies the Principle of Sufficient Reason for man, but not for God? What's happening here is Rowe is looking at the first link in a chain and asking what comes before it. He seeks an integer lower than one. God's will is the first cause; so looking for the cause of God's will seems pointless.

Friday Files: Benson on John 6

Benson's comments on the 'giving' and 'drawing' in John 6 (Volume 4 pages 563-565) are reasonably simple. First, Benson notes the passage teaches man's depravity; no man can believe in Christ to the saving of his soul, unless God give him power. The Father draws men to Christ by the several proofs wherewith he has supported his mission, by the doctrine of his gospel, and by those influences of his grace, which are necessary to give men a right discernment of the evidences of religion, and of the certainly and importance of the great truths of it, and to impress these things deeply on their minds. This drawing is powerful but not irresistible as can be seen in Jeremiah 31:3 "With loving kindness have drawn thee", John 12:32 "If l be lifted up from the earth I will draw all men unto me", and Hosea 11:4, God "drew Israel with the cords of a man, with bands of love". Finally, God gives to Christ all that hearken to the teaching of my Father, and in consequence thereof see themselves to be in a lost estate, guilty, depraved, weak, and wretched, and therefore follow the drawings of his grace and they trust Christ for their salvation.

Minor Mistranslation in the Works of James Arminius

I was confussed something Arminius said in his response to Perkins so I looked it up in the original Latin. Turns out it was a mistranslation.

In the former case [the creation of animals, plants…], the good communicated is limited, as each creature receives that which is appropriate to itself, according to the diversity of their natures, but, in the latter [the creation of men and angels], there is a communication of supreme and infinite good, which is God, in the union with whom consists the happiness of rational creatures. Reason demanded that this communication should be made contrary to justice, wherefore He gave a law to His creatures, obedience to which was made the condition on which that communication should be made. Therefore, this was the first decree concerning the final cause of rational creatures, and the glory of God to be illustrated by justice and the highest goodness — highest as to the good to be communicated, not absolutely; by goodness joined to justice, in the case of those who should be made partakers of the highest good, through steadfastness in the truth; by punitive justice, in the case of those who should make themselves unworthy of it by their disobedience. (link)

The bolded sentence in the original Latin was:

Postulavit autem ratio, ut ista communicatio non fieret citra justitiam, quare legem dedit istis creaturis fuis, in cuius obedientia conditionem posuit, sub qua communicatio ista sieret

Instead of “should be made contrary to justice” it should be rendered “should not be made without regard to justice”. The idea isn’t injustice, nor is it mercy. Rather, God desired to declare His justice in sharing Himself with men and angels.

Friday Files: Benson on Acts 13:48

Joseph Benson makes several key points in his commentaries on Acts 13:48 page 772. He argues that the Calvinist translation of tasso entails reprobation and impugns the God's character. He argues that the Calvinist view breaks down the parallel of the rejection in verse 46 with the acceptance in verse 48. He notes that tasso is never understood as predestination and is frequently dispose, place, or appoint.

Benson then makes a vital point: "the Syriac, likewise, one of the most ancient versions of the New Testament, has rendered the passage in the same sense, which is of great moment, as that translation was made before the meaning of this place was disputed by the different sects and parties of Christians." Benson then he shows that a wide array of scholars translate tasso as 'disposed' rather than 'ordained' including: Doddridge, Hammond, Heylin, Waterland, Whitby, Dodd and Sellon.

Benson concludes: "the sum is: All those, and only those, now believed, who yielded to, instead of resisting the convictions produced in their minds by the preaching of the truth, and the influence of the grace of God, which truth was preached with equal clearness to others, and which grace, in a similar way, visited and strove with others: for God had not reprobated the rest. It was his will that they also should have been saved, but by yielding to inclinations, affections, and passions, which they themselves knew to be sinful, and to which they were under no necessity of yielding, they rejected the counsel of God against themselves, and thrust salvation from them. For they who then repented and believed were not constrained so to do, but grace and mercy were then freely and copiously offered to them, and pressed upon them, and they did not put it away, but yielded to its influence. So that a great multitude, even of such as, it seems, had been idolatrous Gentiles, were converted."

Benson's position represents a middle road between Wesley's "successful prevenient grace" and Whitby's "they disposed themselves"; in that God disposed them for eternal life.

Chrysostom on the 'drawing' and 'giving' in John 6

Chrysostom makes a great point. John 6:45 really helps explain John 6:37 and 44. God teaches and we learn, if we choose to, but some choose not to learn. Those that learn from the Father are the Father's. (John 17:6) The Father gives those that learn to the Son. Here are the passages and Chrysostom's comments [emphasis mine]:

John 6:37
All that the Father gives Me shall come to Me, and him that comes to Me I will in nowise cast out.

But perhaps some one will say, If all that the Father gives, and whomsoever He shall draw, comes unto You, if none can come unto You except it be given him from above, then those to whom the Father gives not are free from any blame or charges. These are mere words and pretenses. For we require our own deliberate choice also, because whether we will be taught is a matter of choice, and also whether we will believe. And in this place, by the which the Father gives Me, He declares nothing else than that the believing on Me is no ordinary thing, nor one that comes of human reasonings, but needs a revelation from above, and a well-ordered soul to receive that revelation. (link)

John 6:44
No man can come unto Me, except the Father which has sent Me draw Him.

The Manichæans spring upon these words, saying, that nothing lies in our own power; yet the expression shows that we are masters of our will. For if a man comes to Him, says some one, what need is there of drawing? But the words do not take away our free will, but show that we greatly need assistance. And He implies not an unwilling comer, but one enjoying much succor.

How then, says some one, does the Father draw? This the Prophet explained of old, when he proclaimed beforehand, and said, John 6:45 They shall all be taught of God. Isaiah 54:13

Do you see the dignity of faith, and that not of men nor by man, but by God Himself they shall learn this? And to make this assertion credible, He referred them to their prophets. If then 'all shall be taught of God,' how is it that some shall not believe? Because the words are spoken of the greater number. Besides, the prophecy means not absolutely all, but all that have the will. For the teacher sits ready to impart what he has to all, and pouring forth his instruction unto all. (link)

John 6:65
And He said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto Me except it were given unto Him from above from My Father.

...when you hear that He has given, imagine not merely an arbitrary distribution, but that if any has rendered himself worthy to receive the gift, he has received it. (link)

My Most Popular Post

For whatever reason, this post get's the most hits by a rather wide margin and has consistently over time.

http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2008/05/commands-and-invitations-for-impossible.html

Perhaps it's the subject matter of the post, or perhaps it's the Star Trek analogy that triggers google searches (although people do seem to spend time on the page). Another interesting thing is that there are very few comments, but posts that generated lots of comments don't get read near as often. Hum... Not sure what to make of it.

The Enemy of my Enemy

Calvinist Greg Welty states: Clearly then, the controversy between Calvinists and non-Calvinists over unconditional election is not the Calvinists’ assertion that God elects some for salvation, since non-Calvinists believe this too. Rather, the controversy is over the Calvinists’ negative claim, namely, the denial that divine election unto salvation is on the basis of works or foreseen faith. (link) It's interesting to me that while Calvinists are not united on the doctrine of election; they all agree Arminianism is wrong. So as opposed to formulating the doctrine of election in a positive assertion unique to Calvinism, they simply deny the Arminian view of foreseen faith. This has it's roots in the supra vs. sub lapsarian controversy. If they all agreed that God choose from among pre-fallen man or post-fallen man they could form such a positive assertion. But since they disagree on this point, they go with the enemy of my enemy approach and target Arminianism.

The problem is this "raises the bar". Calvinists must now shoulder the difficult task of proving a negative – they must specifically take out Arminianism. So instead of showing XYZ is taught in scripture (or the preponderance of evidence leans that way), which is all the Arminian must do; Calvinist must show ABC is denied in scripture (not just ‘not taught’, but explicitly denied). In short, internal disagreements within Calvinism require them to shoulder an a-symmetrical burden of proof in comparison to Arminianism.

Apollo's Chariot at Busch Gardens

Just took the family to Busch Gardens. Not my youtube clip, but this is my favorite ride in the park.

Friday Files: Whitby on Acts 13:48

Dr. Whitby discusses Acts 13:48 in his Discorses on the 5 Points, page 70. First, he gives three problems with the Calvinist translation and then provides multiple examples of how tasso 'ordained' is often translated 'disposed'.

Election entails reprobation and so what necessity could there be, 'that the word of God should be first preached to them as we read, verse 46. Was it only that their damnation might be greater? This impugns God's character.

The Apostle gives this reason why he turned from the Jews to the Gentiles,—because 'the Jews had thrust away the word of God from them, and judged themselves unworthy of eternal life; (verse 46,) but that's not a good reason to turn from the Jews to the Gentiles, since the Jews were just rejecting because they had to.

If Paul knew they were reprobate, why doth St. Paul, by God's commission, speak here to them thus, ' Be it known to you, brethren, that by this Jesus is declared to you remission of sins? Why does he add, 'and by this man every one that believes is justified, &c..? Why does he vehemently exhort them to 'beware lest that saying of the prophet Habakkuk should be verified of them, You will not believe though one declare it to you? For could God have determined that these very persons should not believe to life eternal, and yet commission his apostles to tell them, that 'remission of sins and justification to life,' was proposed to them?

These things seem clearly to evince, this cannot be the proper import of the words. But they will very well admit of these two senses: (1.; As many as were disposed for eternal life, believed; for the word tetagmenos, which we here render ' ordained,' is used in this very book to signify a man, not outwardly ordained, but inwardly disposed, or one determined, not by God, but by his own inclinations, to do such a thing; as when it is said, St. Paul ' went on foot from Assos hto gar hen diatetagmenos for so he was disposed;'(Acts 20:13) the son of Sirach says, that the conduct or government of a wise man is tetagmenos, not ordained by God, but 'well ordered or disposed by himself.' (Sirach 10:1) Thus Philo saith to Cain, "Thou needest not fear being killed by them who are, art en se tetagmenoi, 'ranked on thy side'," (quod deter. p 144) or of the same dispositions and inclinations with thee; and he saith to those children who having had vicious parents, were themselves virtuously inclined, that they are ameino tetagmenoi tazei, ' placed in a better rank;' (De Nobilit. p. 702. c)and speaking of Esau and Jacob, he represents Esau as fierce, subject to anger and other passions, and governed by his brutish part, but Jacob as a lover of virtue and truth, and so en beltiovi tetagmenon tazei, ' placed in a better rank,' (De praemiis et poenis. p. 712 B) or of a better temper and disposition; and adds, that ° Samuel was tetagmenos to Theo, ' well disposed towards God.' (De Termul. p. 203. C.) So Simplicius interprets this word; for when Epictetus had said, "If thou desirest to be a philosopher, so retain the things that seem best to thee, us os upo Thex tetagmenos eis tauten ten tazin, 'as being by God placed in that rank,' (Enchir. c. 29) that is," saith he, os upo Thex protrepomenos epi tauta," 'as being by God incited to these things'." (Simp. p.139) And to this sense the context leads, the persons opposite to those 'disposed for eternal life,' being those who through their indisposition to embrace the offer of it, were ' unworthy of eternal life'.

Friday Files: Edgar's The Meaning of Proginwskw (Foreknowledge)

Thomas R. Edgar's THE MEANING OF PROGINWSKW (“FOREKNOWLEDGE”) is a word study on 'foreknow' and 'foreknowledge'. Edgar first notes that "In secular Greek, proginwskw meant “to foreknow, to know beforehand.” Scholars do not seriously dispute this definition." He then contends that "due to strong evidence for the meaning “know beforehand,” those who argue otherwise face the burden of proof for establishing the exegetical necessity for their proposed meaning. The theoretical possibility or the interpreter’s theological propensity is not sufficient. If “to know beforehand” fits the meaning in a New Testament passage, then this must be the preferred interpretation."


Edgar then discusss all the passages with foreknow (Acts 26:5; Romans 8:29; 11:2; 1 Peter 1:20; and 2 Peter 3:17) and foreknowledge (Acts 2:23 , 1 Peter 1:2.) and explains with "to know beforehand" works in each case. Edgar deals with the two main Calvinist objections: (1) The meaning of proginwskw in this passage is to be derived from the use of ginwskw, “know,” in the LXX, and yâdau in the MT (Hebrew Old Testament) rather than from proginwskw, and (2) the personal object, “whom,” requires the meaning of “intimate relationship,” or “electing choice,” for proginwskw. Edgar points out that appealing to ginwskw and yâdau is an overt admission that the deterministic meaning desired by many interpreters cannot be derived from proginwskw itself. He contends “Neither does the prefix simply give a temporal thrust to this verb. It also narrows its semantic range, in this case to knowing beforehand. The entire semantic range of the root verb ginwskw is not carried over to the compounded form. For example, even though ginwskw, on occasion refers to sexual relations, proginwskw does not mean “to have sexual relations beforehand.” Edgar cites Acts 26:5 as a counter example of the "personal object" argument where foreknow is used personally, but implies foreknowing the person’s actions.