Final Response to Paul Manata

Paul’s final post contains somewhat of a summary of our debate, so I won’t respond point by point since that would just be repeating much of what has already been said. While I am not crying ‘straw man’ over his rundown of my argument, I do think it combines my initial argument with my responses to Paul’s statements on choose and determinism. Paul did bring up some new arguments about epistemology which I won’t address either since I doubt the relevance and I would have to do quite a bit of research– to his credit, Paul is much better read on these matters than I. Also, I won’t comment on the role of philosophy and scripture (since I said enough already), even though I actually consider that matter of greater importance than the LFW/determinism debate. The one area I will address is Paul’s definition of choose.

Choose = df to select freely out of a greater number of things, where this selecting is a mental action explained in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal for choosing one (or more) thing to make a selection out of a group of things, or an intentional object, which is about or directed at the future and opative in mood, i.e., wishing to pick x-thing and that it be good for x-thing to prevail in the world rather than y-thing being picked and prevailing in the world.

I don’t think “to select freely out of a greater number of things” is a technical “philosophical” definition. Perhaps a case could be made that the definitions I provided are better or more common, but I don’t think that’s necessary. So this shifts the burden of proof to me to show this definition rules out determinism.

P1: Choosers only consider selecting things they think to be possible
P2: Choosing is out of multiple things
C1: So choosers believe in multiple possibilities
P3: But determinism rules out multiple possibilities and determinists can not consistently believe in multiple possibilities
C2: So choosing rules out determinism.

P1 and P3 are probably the only controversial premises. P1 can be clarified by the fact that we never choose something we think to be impossible. If we think something is impossible, we rule it out. By Paul’s definition, we choose things we believe to be conducive to our goal, so clearly the impossible isn’t conducive to our goal. P1 can be further clarified, in that choosing a thing entails an intention to act to produce that thing. For example, choosing an apple over a pear entails the intention to reach out and grab the apple. But actions are the actualization of a possibility and no one believes his own hypothetical actions (when he’s evaluating what to choose) to be impossible. So P1 seems sound. Even if exceptions could be found, certainly P1 is normally the case.

P3 is the subject of the debate between Steve and myself (so perhaps Paul’s view lives on in Steve), but given Paul is a semi-compatibilist he should grant P3.

With that, I would like to thank Paul for his time and this stimulating debate. God be with you Paul!

The Choose debate (from my POV)

Long ago I provide a list of scriptural passages that I thought taught freewill. (link) Turretinfan asked me: Why do any of the passages you cited, or the combination of passages, require anything more than a simple, Calvinistic free will? I asked him what is Calvinist free will, so I can respond? He said: “Calvinistic free will simply says that a choice is a determination or judgment by an animate being with respect to one object in preference to another object.” I responded: “Choice and preference can be synonyms, but to use a synonym to define its counterpart is somewhat bootstrapped.” (link)

I didn’t consider the “thesaurus approach” precise enough and pushed for a more rigorous definition, which Turretinfan was somewhat reluctant to provide, in fear that it would obscure rather than clarify the issue. Turretinfan warned me that philosophy may just confuse things. (link)

Gene Bridges said: we Calvinists have no burden of proof to prove "compatibilism," but the Libertarians MUST prove libertarianism since they're positing it as axiomatic. …GIMJ is doing a marvelous job of demonstrating that Arminianism has no exegetical argument against Calvinism of merit, it's all ethical and philosophical when the exegetical dress is removed. (link)

Consider this the father of the “choose” argument, but you should also meet the mother. I objected to Bernable’s use of a divided sense of freedom. (link) I thought that compatiblism fails since in some ultimate way we are not free given we are not free from determinism. TF responded again warning me of my use of philosophy. I was starting to think compatiblism could only survive by keeping its head down. I again asked TF to define choice and he gave me a definition that I thought sufficient to conflict with determinism.

Here’s a concise form of my argument against a divided sense of freedom:

P1: When one posits that idea A is logically compatible with idea B, he is
speaking of idea A in a compound sense, including idea B P2: compatiblism posits that the idea of being able to freely choose between 1 & 2 and the idea of being determined to 1 are logically consistent C1: Therefore, the compatiblist is speaking of being able to freely choose between 1 & 2 in a compound sense, including the idea of being determined to 1 P3: Compatiblists can say we are able to freely choose 2 only in a divided sense, excluding being determined to 1. C2: therefore, compatiblists speak both in a divided and compound sense at the same time. (link)
(more here)

Ok, so the three key takeaways: 1) I didn’t think compatiblism works but 2) I needed a sufficient definition of choice to demonstrate why, so the “thesaurus approach” would not do and 3) determinists had been reluctant to get more precise, criticizing me for being too philosophical. The dictionary was simply a tool to get me past problems 2 # 3.

OK, enter Paul Manata… In many ways Paul’s approach was the exact opposite of Turretinfan’s.

Here’s my initial argument: The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives. (similar definitions available here and here) Determinism includes the idea that preceding causal forces render all our actions necessary such that they cannot be otherwise. So a “predetermined choice” implies an “impossible possibility” and an “inalternate alternative”. Since the bible states that we have wills and choose, determinism isn’t consistent with the bible.(link)

Paul on the other hand had cited philosophers Kane and Goetz/Taliaferro and expressed concern that we frequently hear that "choice" just means some kind of libertarianism about the will. The second is like unto it: "You Calvinists must necessarily go against laymen, common sensical understandings of certain terms. Your position is counter-intuitive. Ordinary folk laugh at you." (link)

The posture is the exact opposite – Paul sees the threat coming from the common parlance and appeals to philosophers; TF had warned me of being too philosophical and wished for me to stick to common parlance. Further, Paul seems skeptical about classic compatiblism (i.e. #1). It literally seems like all my problems above (1 to 3) are gone and the main aspects of the debate were over before it started. I was standing ready to try to knock down all forms of compatibilism, but the attack never came.

So I criticize Kane and Paul criticizes the dictionary. When Paul seemed ready to grant that the common man’s view of choice conflicted with determinism, I moved in to close the discussion by saying scripture was written to the common man: if Paul admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatiblist) and it uses the terms choice and choose. (link)

I don’t want to overestimate Turretinfan’s influence but he did advise Paul to minimize the definition of choose (link) and then Paul argued that 1 to 3 above are back on the table. (link)

So my argument:

P1: The bible says people have wills and choose P2: But choosing rules out determinism C1: Therefore, the bible rules out determinism. (link)

P2 is another way of saying compatibilism doesn't make sense, which Steve and TF have opposed. Compatibilism can knock out P2, but compatibilism has to stand to be able to do so.

Response to Paul on 2 Kings 10

This post is in response to Paul's post "Choose the best" based on 2 Kings 10.

Response to Paul on Clarity of Scripture

This youtube clip is a response to Paul Manata's post called some clean up. I want to be clear that I do think of Calvinists as brothers in the Lord.

Restart of Paul's Arguments

This youtube clip is in response to Paul's post called kaput. The big picture is that Paul's recent dictionary definition put him where Steve was several months ago and likely this path would have similar results to my exhange with Steve (i.e. him saying here's why such and such squares with determinism and me saying here's why it does not).

Rabbit trail on PAP and Frankfurt Examples

Paul claims some libertarian philosophers deny PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities). He cites Timothy O' Connor, David Hunt and William Lane Craig. (link) This topic is somewhat tangential to our determinism/choose debate, but it's interesting so I thought I would address it. I tend to disagree with PAP but I also disagree with some of Craig's recent comments. I don't think O'Connor was denying PAP and I find Hunt's comments prima-facia inconsistent, so I will only address Craig.

PAP and Frankfurt Examples

PAP is the idea that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. (Free will Handbook. Fisher. Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatiblism. p283.) Note that not just some, but all events for which we are accountable must be free and not necessary under PAP. So for example those holding to PAP must deny we are morally accountable for our actions that result from prior free choices but are themselves not free. Understood this way, not just some, but a great deal of libertarian thinkers deny PAP. Arminius' commentary on Romans 9:19 reveals he denies PAP: If, indeed, the man commits that which deserves hardening of free-will, he is subjected to blame, and is worthy of wrath, even if he may be hardened by that will, which can not be resisted. For resisting and that freely, the divine will, revealed in the word, which can be resisted, he is brought into that necessity of the divine decree, also revealed in the word, which can not be resisted, and so the will of God is done in reference to him, by whom the will of God is not done. (link) On the other hand, denying PAP is very different then saying man never has alternative possibilities (AP) or even that AP is necessary for moral responsibility.

Here's a Frankfort example: Suppose Jones is in a voting booth deliberating about wheater to vote fro Gore or Bush. After reflection, he chooses to vote for Gore and does vote for Gore by marking his ballot in the normal way. Unbeknownst to him, Black, a liberal neurosurgeon working with the Democratic Party, has implanted a device in Jones's brain which monitors Jones's brain activities. If he is about to choose to vote Democratic, the device simply continues to monitoring and does not intervene in the process in any way. If, however, Jones is about to chose to vote, say, Republican, the device triggers an intervention that involves electronic stimulation of the brain sufficient to produce a choice to vote for the Democrat (and a subsequent Democrate vote). (ibid. 282)

The Frankfort example has numerous problems, such as 1) there is no "sign" beforehand indicating what the choice will be, 2) there's no such thing as a "forced choice" so no device could trigger a choice, 3) the will is part of our immaterial soul, so no physical device could monitor and manipulate it. However, the interesting question is if the Frankfort example can be fixed. Let's look at Craig's attempt.

Response to William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig: "But as you note, I’m a libertarian who thinks that causal determinism is incompatible with freedom. That doesn’t imply that I hold to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which states that a free agent has in a set of circumstances the ability to choose A or not-A. I’m persuaded that so long as an agent’s choice is not causally determined, it doesn’t matter if he can actually make a choice contrary to how he does choose. Suppose that God has decided to create you in a set of circumstances because He knew that in those circumstances you would make an undetermined choice to do A. Suppose further that had God instead known that if you were in those circumstances you would have made an undetermined choice to do not-A, then God would not have created you in those circumstances (maybe it would have loused up His providential plan!). In that case you do not have the ability in those circumstances to make the choice of not-A, but nevertheless your choice of A is, I think, clearly free, for it is causally unconstrained—it you who determines that A will be done. So the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of free choice." (link)

I disagree with Craig's statement - while he patches some of the problems in the prior Frankfort example, he creates some new ones. Middle knowledge looks like it could successfully replace "the sign" and Molinism could replace the "forced choice" and work with an immaterial soul. So it seems the initial Frankfort problems are fixed. However, Craig has some new problems.

First, Craig defines PAP in a much broader sense than Fisher; Craig's not just going after responsibility, he's going after AP. Both Fisher and Craig deny PAP, but given their different definitions of PAP, Fisher denial entails actions that are "necessary but responsible", Craig's denial entails actions that are "necessary but free". For Fisher, the issue is "do you have to have AP in all cases of responsibility?" For Craig, the issue is "do you have to have AP in any cases of freedom?"

The problem with Craig's argument is that middle knowledge entails AP. Everything God knows via His middle knowledge is possible (included within God's natural knowledge). God could not know, via His middle knowledge, that you would choose something that would "louse up His plan", because God's plan totally failing is strictly impossible and not an object of His natural knowledge. This falls into the same category as God sinning. It's logically inconsistent to have a Sinning Holy One, so such scenarios are self-contradictory, logically impossible, and not part of God's natural knowledge. Only in a relative sense (removing some of God's attributes from view) can we even talk about such things without sliding into incoherence.

Nor could God still have middle knowledge of Jones voting democratic without the possibility of Jones voting republican because it would louse up His plan. By middle knowledge God knows which of two or more possibilities would obtain under various circumstances. If nothing else is possible, middle knowledge is unnecessary and superfluous, since God already knows what "would" happen - the only thing that can happen.

If you remove the "it would louse up God's plan" aspect, and just say God chooses not to create that world, then such a choice leaves man with AP. The person can, but will not (and would not) choose otherwise. So Craig's replacement of "the sign" was unsuccessful; it was replace by something that entailed AP - the very element he attempted to remove.

Further, causal indeterminism entails AP; it's the core element of AP. The deterministic/indeterministic distinction is broader than the agent/event causation distinction. Thus, even agent causation may be deterministic or indeterministic. If the agent doesn't have alternative possibilities, then his nature determines him to one and only one action. Although there is a difference between this and deterministic event causation, it's still deterministic, not indeterministic.

Finally, Craig's example doesn't rule out AP. Now God couldn't get me to vote for republican (since I wouldn't do so), but He could create a world where I live in Timbuktu. So there are three possible worlds: vote republican, vote Democrat, and riding a Camel in the Sahara. Now Craig goes further and says what if my voting Democrat messes up His sovereign plan. So God has to put me in the Sahara; permitting me to vote Democrat is impossible (since it would be unwise for God to do so). Oddly enough, we still have alternative possibilities: vote republican or ride a Camel in the Sahara. Not what I had in mind when I entered the voting booth, but twofold possibilities none-the-less, so it's still not deterministic. Even under the assumption that God wouldn't create me at all, "possible me" (the object of God's natural knowledge that did not get actualized) would still have had alternative possibilities.

Now don't get me wrong, I like Craig and still recommend his books. I have no idea how these recent statements he has made could be reconciled with his earlier works. In his chapter "Within One's Power Once More" in his book Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism : Omniscience, Craig states "But assuming that our actions are not causally determined, we have the ability to act in ways other than we in fact act" p. 161. But it seems this recent statements are mistaken.

Why I Reject PAP
I agree with Arminius on the hardness of hearts, but while such acts are voluntary they seem like they are less than choices. Recall Aristotle said: "Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) II.3) Thus, rejecting PAP harmonizes with my choose arguments.

Futher, PAP seems to be interpreted too specifically for my taste. You must be able to vote Democrat or Republican. You must be able to do good or evil. You must be able to eat chocolate or vanilla... Aquinas broke freedom down into two parts: exercise and specification. "Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black." (link) For me, it's enough to choose A or not - I don't need to extend things to the ability to choose A or B. Now this issue is mostly perception not real. Some determinists like to specify "B" and then show B is impossible. But both "A or not" and "A or B" are alternative possibilities. It's just one is more specific than the other.

Scripture and the Common Man

Paul seems to missunderstand my view on scripture. He states: Crucial to Dan’s argument is the claim that “common man” are all, each and every, libertarians. If Dan claims that some “common men” are not indeterminist, but determinist, then he defeats one of his premises, or makes the Bible speak in contradictions. To spell this point out, recall that Dan says, “The Bible is written by and to the common man, it means what they mean, since they mean certain words libertarianly, then the Bible so means those words.” Yet if we allow some (even one?) of the “common men” to whom the Bible was written to be determinists, then it must mean what they mean by the words that are the topic of our discussion. However, since there are indeterminist “common men”, then the Bible must also mean what they mean by the words we are discussing! Therefore, Dan must assume that each and every “common man” is a libertarian, which I find highly implausible. (link) It was not said what was said I said.


The bible message, especially the essentials of the faith, is understandable by common men using their normal means of understanding terms. It's normal for words to have more than one meaning and to use context to define terms. Granted, the bible contains many mysteries but the mode of communicating the mysteries is plain so we can know what we are supposed to know. For example, we know the incarnation is true, but we don't know how it's true. Also, the bible contains things that are "hard to understand" (2 Peter 3:16), but they are still understandable for common people, using normal means - including comparing scripture with scripture. I had thought Paul and I had common ground on this view; but perhaps I am mistaken.


On the issue of the clarity of scriptures, I am with Hodge and other mainline Protestants.
Here's what Charles Hodge had to say on the topic:

The Bible is a plain book. It is intelligible by the people. And they have the right, and are bound to read and interpret it for themselves; so that their faith may rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, and not on that of the Church. Such is the doctrine of Protestants on this subject. It is not denied that the Scriptures contain many things hard to be understood; that they require diligent study; that all men need the guidance of the Holy Spirit in order to right knowledge and true faith. But it is maintained that in all things necessary to salvation they are sufficiently plain to be understood even by the unlearned....

The Scriptures are everywhere addressed to the people, and not to the officers of the Church either exclusively, or specially. The prophets were sent to the people, and constantly said, “Hear, O Israel,” “Hearken, O ye people.” Thus, also, the discourses of Christ were addressed to the people, and the people heard him gladly. All the Epistles of the New Testament are addressed to the congregation, to the “called of Jesus Christ;” “to the beloved of God;” to those “called to be saints;” “to the sanctified in Christ Jesus;” “to all who call on the name of Jesus Christ our Lord;” “to the saints which are in (Ephesus), and to the faithful in Jesus Christ;” or “to the saints and faithful brethren which are in (Colosse);” and so in every instance. It is the people who are addressed. To them are directed these profound discussions of Christian doctrine, and these comprehensive expositions of Christian duty. They are
everywhere assumed to be competent to understand what is written, and are
everywhere required to believe and obey what thus came from the inspired messengers of Christ.

The Scriptures are not only addressed to the people, but the people were called upon to study them, and to teach them unto their children. It was one of the most frequently recurring injunctions to parents under the old dispensation, to teach the Law unto their children, that they again might teach it unto theirs. The “holy oracles” were committed to the people, to be taught by the people; and taught immediately out of the Scriptures, that the truth might be retained in its purity. (link)

Opposing this leaves Paul two unattractive options: 1) give Fisher the fisherman's ring or 2) play the role of the sceptic and deny the scripture speaks plainly on this specific issue. Paul takes a step down the second path by citing Goetz.


“I can’t speak for Charles, but I would not base my belief in libertarianism on passages in the Bible. And I wouldn’t argue against your Calvinism from biblical texts. I believe that the Bible doesn’t teach anything about the issue of free will. It wasn’t written for that purpose, just as it wasn’t written for the purpose of teaching us whether or not we have souls. In short, I believe the Bible is not a philosophical text written to teach philosophy. It doesn’t fail to teach Calvinism because it teaches libertarianism. It simply doesn’t teach anything about the matter of free will.”


The bible doesn't teach us we have souls? The bible shouldn't be used to argue against (and presumably for) Calvinism? Determinism and Calvinism are inseparable. Take irresistible grace: grace is the effectual cause of conversion, such that you cannot do otherwise than convert. That's determinism and necessity. If we can't turn to the bible to answer questions like this, just where does Goetz want us to turn? Him? Is he really tell us to develop our philosophy apart from scripture and then read it into scripture? His whole idea of the role of philosophy is radically different than mine. For me, philosophies' primary role is to help reconcile apparent discrepancies in scripture.


That sound you hear is coming from Geneva, as Calvin is trying to get out of his grave and pimp smack Paul for even quoting something like this. Hopefully Paul disagrees with Goetz and would not attack scripture itself to avoid the force of the argument. I don't know how sola scriptura could be defended without sharing my view here.

Paul asks: what if the “common man” is wrong; does that make the scripture wrong as well? Then God would either not use the term choose or deny the term or explain what He means by it. Take for example the word ‘Baal’. What Baal's followers meant by Baal and what God meant by Baal was different; and God made that sufficiently plain.


Paul asks: what is the referent of “common man?” It appears to function as a static assortment of people. … I dare say that how a “common man” in a stoic society defined terms would not be the same as how a “common man” in an Epicurean society defined terms.

For my purpose, 'common man' is in terms of a whole assembly. The bible was frequently addressed to all of Israel, all of the church.... and that for over a thousand years. Of course, at one point in time, the groups are static, but over time changing is the norm, so common men are changers.

Incidentally, not all stoics were fatalists; Cicero being a notable example. (link) But let’s say stoics did have a different definition of choose. Probably a stoic dictionary would be different, based on the different usage. This does seem problematic, but the early church understood choice in a way that undermined stoic fatalism. So while such a problem could have occurred, it did not.


Let's look at how Justin Martyr refutes fatalism:


And the holy Spirit of prophecy taught us this, telling us by Moses that God spoke thus to the man first created: “Behold, before thy face are good and evil: choose the good.” And again, by the other prophet Isaiah, that the following utterance was made as if from God the Father and Lord of all: “Wash you, make you clean; put away evils from your souls; learn to do well; judge the orphan, and plead for the widow: and come and let us reason together, saith the Lord: And if your sins be as scarlet, I will make them white as wool; and if they be red like as crimson, I will make them white as snow. And if ye be willing and obey Me, ye shall eat the good of the land; but if ye do not obey Me, the sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.”And that expression, “The sword shall devour you,” does not mean that the disobedient shall be slain by the sword, but the sword of God is fire, of which they who choose to do wickedly become the fuel. Wherefore He says, “The sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.” And if He had spoken concerning a sword that cuts and at once despatches, He would not have said, shall devour. And so, too, Plato, when he says, “The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless,” took this from the prophet Moses and uttered it. For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories. So that what we say about future events being foretold, we do not say it as if they came about by a fatal necessity; but God foreknowing all that shall be done by all men, and it being His decree that the future actions of men shall all be recompensed according to their several value, He foretells by the Spirit of prophecy that He will bestow meet rewards according to the merit of the actions done, always urging the human race to effort and recollection, showing that He cares and provides for men. (link)


Justin turns to scripture first and then to philosophers instructed of scripture. He considers scripture sufficient to put down fatalism. More to the point, his understanding of 'choose' is sufficient to put down fatalism. But Paul's definition of choose reconciles just fine with fatalism. Given the differences in methodologies here, it's no wonder the conclusions are radically different.

Determinist 'Common Men'

Hard on the heels of my “the common man has a libertarian definition of choose” claim is Paul’s retort that not all common men are libertarians. (link) Paul cites a survey which he mistakenly attributes to Eddy Nahmias, Jason Turner, Steve Morris but was actually conducted by Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz as a follow on study to the original survey. (link) The original survey can be found here. Both surveys seem to favor determinism, but only the original study points out it's own shortcomings, openly discusses them and appeals to others to fix them.


The first study states: "we view these results as preliminary, not conclusive, and hence as motivation for further research on folk intuitions about freedom and responsibility and for further consideration of the role such intuitions should play in the free will debate" and "A potential problem more specific to our studies is that the presence of determinism might not have been salient enough in the scenarios... we agree that the more salient determinism is in the scenarios, the more significant the results would be (see Black & Tweedale, 2002)" and "if one is able to find a way to increase the salience of determinism without masking it with a different free-will threat, we welcome the attempt.


Let's look at how this problem plays out in the second study that Paul cites. In Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz study 105 participants in three groups answered 'yes' 30 to 52% of the time to the question: do you think that our actions can be free if all of them are entirely determined by our genes, our neuro-physiology, and our upbringing?


How overt is determinism? On the one hand 'determined' is in the question. On the other hand, any contribution to determinism via external forces (i.e. our circumstances) is explicitly ruled out: 'entirely determined by our genes, neuro-physiology and upbringing'. But that's the real fear about determinism: that something outside of us determines what we do. Our genes, neuro-physiology, and upbringing are a significant part of our personality or character or self. So apparently the question assumes self-determination and excludes the treating aspects of determinism.


Now it seems to me that in determinism, given our genes, neuro-physiology, and upbringing external circumstances determine our actions. It's like throwing a ball against a wall. If the wall is at a 90 degree angle, a ball thrown straight at the wall will bounce one way, but if the wall is at some other angle the ball will bounce another way. So the "angle of the wall" (i.e. our genes...) is a contributing factor. But given the wall is 90 degrees, what really determines the outcome is if the ball comes in straight or from some angle. And that's intuitively threatening. But it's not just omitted from the question; the question precludes it.


Perhaps determinists might argue that it really is only stuff internal to us that does the determining and not things external to us. But libertarians would have their retorts as well. In that case, the whole discussion seems to be assumed in favor of determinism in the survey question.


Had the survey question disclosed that our genes, neuro-physiology, and upbringing themselves were predetermined and eternal factors play a major role in determining what we do, the results might have been different. At best, threatening factors were omitted and at worst, the question could be read in a libertarian way (i.e. we self-determine our actions and given the circumstances we could self-determine this or that).

But there's a second problem with the way the question could be read. Let's assume it's read as as determinism. Might people be tempted to answer it, given the assumption determinism is true?

Before this last election, I pushed as hard as I could for McCain, but now that it’s over and my side lost, I support Obama. I used to be a Calvinist. When I first became one, I didn’t stop witnessing or trying to do the right thing, or feel hopeless. Not only did my soteriology change, but all the underlying assumptions changed with it.

That “if” in the survey question is a big “if”. It makes me assume I am on the loosing side of the determinism/LFW debate. Between compatiblism or hard determinism, I would go with compatiblism. So I might have answered yes to the question. If I find out I was wrong about Arminianism, I wouldn’t curse God and die, nor would I eat, drink and be merry; I would become a Calvinist. There’s a huge difference between saying your notion of freedom holds you back from determinism and saying your notion of freedom is so strong you would not modify it even if you knew for a fact you were wrong.

Now I don't envy the task of coming up with a fair and balanced survey - rigging the game would be easy but coming up with reliable results would be hard. But I do think it's fair to discount the results given the wording used.

But leaving that aside, it seems implausible that between 30 and 52% of the population don't use the normal definition of 'choose'. Wouldn't we expect to see their definition in the dictionary? If that many people were OK with some determinist notions, it’s far more likely they use the normal definition of choose and are unaware of the conflict.

Choice vs. Choose

In our debate, I argued that the dictionary definition of choose rules out determinism. In Paul's recent rejoinder he states: “I cited numerous dictionaries that didn’t include a PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities) element”. (link) This is true, but misleading. Paul defined choice, but not choose. My argument was based on the verb choose, not the noun choice. In this post I would like to revisit the dictionaries, and explain why it's important to distinguish between choice and choose.

The Dictionary Definition of Choose

The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives.

Dictionary.com defines choose as: to select from a number of possibilities; pick by preference

thefreedictionary.com defines choose as: To select from a number of possible alternatives; decide on and pick out.

The Oxford Compact English Dictionary defines choose as: pick out as being the best of two or more alternatives.

Merriam-Webster's defines choose as: to select freely and after consideration

Encarta World English Dictionary: decide from among range of options

Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary: to decide what you want from a range of things or possibilities:

The Wordsmyth English Dictionary: to select from two or more alternatives.

I could go on, but you get the point.

Why Not Choice?

Choose is an action verb; choice is a noun referring to the completed action. What is special about choosing isn’t the resultant state after the action, but rather the action itself. In choosing one must prefer on alternative to another. While the resultant state is the willing of only one thing; the process of getting to that state involves two things.

On the TV show Smallville, Lex Luther finds one of Clark Kent’s crystals. He has it tested and finds out that it’s made from a special material not found on earth. The question isn't how it coexists with other elements on this planet, but how it got there. Similarly, the verb choose involves twofold possibilities and the noun choice gives the resultant one actuality.


Alternatives and Lowest Common Denominator

Turretinfan provides some definitions of the verb ‘choose’ that don’t use the word possibilities. (link) He thus concludes using a least common denominator method that ‘possibilities’ should “hardly be viewed as the actual "common man" meaning of the term”. The problem is his statement “none of these definitions included the word "possible" or an equivalent concept.” His definitions includes the word “alternatives” which is an equivalent concept. Alternatives are possibilities or things we can choose.

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language - The choice between two mutually exclusive possibilities.

Encarta World English Dictionary - possibility of choosing: the possibility of choosing between two different things or courses of action

Merriam-Webster's - a proposition or situation offering a choice between two or more things only one of which may be chosen b: an opportunity for deciding between two or more courses or propositions2 a: one of two or more things, courses, or propositions to be chosen b: something which can be chosen instead

Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary: something that is different from something else, especially from what is usual, and offering the possibility of choice:

The Wordsmyth English Dictionary - one of two or more possibilities; option.

thefreedictionary.com - The choice between two mutually exclusive possibilities

Dictionary.com - a choice limited to one of two or more possibilities

Oxford Compact English Dictionary - one of two or more available possibilities

Hopefully it's clear that the 'dictionary definition' of choose includes at least two possibilities. But determinism prohibits twofold possibilities, so the dictionary rules out determinism.

Kane's Technical Definition vs. Paul Manata

Kane defines choice as “the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do” (Robert Kane, “Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will.” Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p.423). The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives. Paul seems ready to grant that the dictionary definition rules out determinism, but holds that Kane’s definition is perfectly valid and does not rule out determinism. In our debate, I took the position that Kane’s definition was technical and philosophical and therefore inappropriate for understanding scriptural usage of the word “choose’. In Paul’s recent rejoinder, he support’s Kane’s definition by citing numerous libertarian “big guns” (Plantinga, Hasker, Timpe and arguably O’Conner) who agree with Kane. Paul didn’t provide another definition of ‘choose’, but he cited studies showing large percentages of the population hold deterministic notions to oppose my claim that ‘the common man’ uses the dictionary definition of choose and undermines determinism. From this, it seems Paul implicitly claims that Kane’s definition (or something like it) is used by a substantial percentage of the English speakers.

Kane’s definition of choice is technical and a restricted sense and distinct from to the common parlance notion of choice. It carves out some things at are obviously choices and embraces some things that are not choices. So Paul’s major mistake is to try to put it on equal footing with the dictionary definition of choice and insert it into the mouth of the common man.

Kane makes it very clear that his sense of choice is restricted and there are other valid common uses of choice. “First, when it is said that choice or decision is by definition the formation of intention or purpose, the terms “choice” and “decision” are being used in a specific sense. One is talking about choosing or deciding “to do” something or other. The terms “decide” or “choose” have other uses. For example, one can decide “that” something ought to be done (is the best thing to do, etc.). In the case of choose, one can speak of choosing or selecting an object from a set”. (Kane. Free Will and Values. p.17-18)

Kane gives many warning flags about how he is restricting his sense of ‘choice’. Kane states his sense of ‘choice’ excludes ‘choices’ regarding:

• What is to be believed (as opposed to what is to be done) (p. 16)
• What we ought to do (as opposed to what we will do) (p. 16)
• Things (as opposed to acts to be done) (p. 18)
• A pear vs. an apple on a tray of fruit (p. 18)

Yet it’s fundamental to Paul’s case that there be some other definition of ‘choice’ besides the dictionaries, which is common enough to be used by a substantial percentage of English speakers. Kane himself tells us that people talk about choosing pears over apples. So clearly Kane’s restricted sense of choice won’t do; even for the “deterministic common man”. You can’t live your life with Kane’s definition of choice; but you can have a technical philosophical discussion.

On the one hand Kane’s definition is too technical to compete with the dictionary, but on the other hand, even with Kane's technical definition, normal cases of choice do rule out determinism.

Kane’s understanding of choice is somewhat broader than my own spanning both self-forming actions (SFAs) and impulsive decisions. ¹ For Kane, SFAs are the main event satisfying the “common parlance claim that the agents can choose either way ‘at will’”. (Oxford Handbook of Free Will. p. 420) SFAs cannot be causally determined; “the agents have a plurality of real alternatives from which to choose, she has the capacity to make either choice by making an effort to do so.” (Oxford Handbook of Free Will. p. 428) So regarding these basic attributes of SFAs, Kane and I are in agreement. Clearly, when Kane speaks of predetermined choices, he isn’t talking about SFAs because SFAs rule out determinism. However, Kane doesn’t limit choice to SFAs so let’s look at what Kane has to say about impulsive decisions.

“We shall assume that choices or decisions (to do) as described in 2.2 always terminate some process of reasoning, however brief. But such a process need not always be called “deliberation” in the ordinary sense of that term. There are such things as impulsive, spur of the moment, or snap, decisions. … What is lacking in such impulsive or spur of the moment decisions is reflection upon and debate over alternatives to the option chosen. Since we ordinarily think of deliberation as involving such a debate over alternatives in foro interno, we should qualify our earlier statement and say that choices or decisions to do normally terminate deliberations in the ordinary sense involving consideration of, and reflection upon , more than one option. But in certain cases of impulsive or spur of the moment decisions, they may terminate minimal processes of practical reasoning in which only one option is considered and assessed. Though spur of the moment or snap decisions occur, we ordinarily think of ourselves as being more free in the normal cases in which choices or decision terminate deliberation, because in such cases we are more likely to feel that we ‘could have chosen otherwise’.“ (Kane. Free Will and Values. p.19)

So for Kane, normal choices (choices following deliberation) rule out determinism. Kane reasons “if one form or another of determinism were true, it seems that it would not be “up to us” what we chose from an array of alternative possibilities, since only one alternative would be possible and so we could not have done otherwise.” (Kane. Free Will. Introduction.)That’s my argument; a predetermined choice entails the contradiction of an “impossible possibility” or “one possibilities” or “a singular plural” or “1 =2”.

But on the other hand, Kane and I do have a minor disagreement in nomenclature (not in concept) about “impulsive decisions” or “decisions without deliberation”. Kane calls them choices, but I (following Aristotle) would call them volition but not a choice. Aristotle said: "Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. H. Rackham) II.3)

So while for Kane choice doesn’t rule out determinism, normal choice (choice plus deliberation) does. Thus passages of scripture saying things like “consider what you should do” (Judges 18:13-15) rule out determinism in even Kane’s sense.

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¹In fairness to Paul, Kane may hold to a third category of choice besides SFAs and impulsive decisions - discovering purposes formed by prior SFAs. “Choices or decisions are will-setting when they do not result from the agents’ merely discovering during deliberation what they already favored, but when the agents make the reasons for preferring one option prevail at the moment of choice by choosing or deciding.” (Oxford Handbook. p. 412) Still, the same reasoning will apply and these can be treated like impulsive decisions.

Response to Paul

I have been writting responses to Paul's and Steve's recent posts. (link) (link) Paul's post was massive so my response was getting too long. God willing, I will break it down into chunks and post it over the next few days.

God be with you,
Dan

Arminian Internet Resources on Romans 9

Reviewed Commentaries Ranked One to Eleven

Commentator	Review	Linguistics	Logic	Clarity	TOTAL
Beet	Review	4	3	4	10
Schooley	Review	8	5	1	14
Goodwin	Review	3	2	10	15
Whedon	Review	7	4	5	16
Arminius	Review	6	1	11	18
Morison	Review	2	11	6	19
Godet	Review	1	10	8	19
Hamilton	Review	11	7	2	20
Benson	Review	5	6	9	20
Moore	Review	10	8	4	22
Clarke	Review	9	9	7	25

These commentaries were subjectively ranked from one to eleven; one being the best, two the next best and so on. Linguistics was scored based on use of original languages and explaining things phrase by phrase. Logic was scored based on explaining the text, leaving the fewest unanswered questions and coherence of the big picture. Clarity was scored based on ease of reading and understanding the author.
Additional Resouces on Romans 9
My first commentary
My revised commentary
Wesley’s Predestination Calmly Considered
Joseph Sutcliffe’s brief commentary
Wesley’s Commentary
William Klein’s article: “Paul’s use of Kalein: A Proposal”
Brian Abasciano’s article Corporate Election in Romans 9
Dennis McCallum’s youtube clips
Brennon Hatshorn’s Thoughts
Billy Birch’s 22 part series on Romans 9
Kevin Jackson part 1
Kevin Jackson part 2
Skinner’s Commentary
Pristine Faith Restoration Society

This list is not comprehensive, but I would like it to be. If you know of other commentaries on Romans 9 from an Arminian perspective, please comment with a link. Thanks!

Chrysostom and accounting for differences

Calvinists sometimes argue that fact that some people are good and others bad is evidence that God predetermines all things. The Calvinist arguments run down two distinct tracts: 1) a forking maneuver and 2) an incoherence argument against libertarian free will. The forking maneuver looks something like this: either man or God is the difference maker – if it’s man, we have something to brag about, if it’s God, libertarian free will is undone. The incoherence argument runs something like this: the difference is due either to nature or circumstances, so something causes the difference or it’s random – in neither case does the agent have the type of control required for libertarian free will. The purpose of this post is to show that this argument is an inversion of Chrysostom’s argument supporting libertarian freedom.

Calvinists maintain that election is unconditional – the elect are not chosen because of some quality they possess which others don’t possess. In this, they are not just rejecting works or merit as a basis of election, but also faith and any other good quality or disposition. We all come from the same lump of clay, so the differences between the people weren’t the reason one was chosen and another rejected. But this seems random or arbitrary.

If you ask a Calvinist why it glorifies God to choose this person rather than someone else, or why He doesn’t choose everyone, they typically admit they don’t know. They may say “God has a reason even if we don’t know it” and perhaps they might even accuse you of prying into God’s secret council.

But whatever God’s other reason was, it couldn’t be related to some good quality or disposition in us. Let’s say I am building a house and need one nail. Even though my end goal is to build the house, I would still pick longer nails over short ones if the job called for it. In that case longer nails are more suitable for my purpose, so this example can’t be representative of unconditional election. But if any nail will do and all the nails are the same, then I don’t care which one I pick out of a jar full of nails. So in this way, whatever the other reason is, it doesn’t explain why one was chosen and another rejected.

So there’s a natural tension in Calvinism between the randomness in election with respect to us and not knowing God’s other reasons for electing one and not another. Ultimately, they don’t have a satisfying explanation as to why one person’s salvation glorifies God and another’s does not.

So what is Chrysostom’s answer as to what makes the difference? Choice. Each agent chooses for themselves, thus we end up with differences.

When therefore thou blamest, thou showest that the fault is not of nature but of his choice. For if in those things, which we do not blame, we bear witness that the whole is of nature, it is evident that where we reprove, we declare that the offense is of the choice…. Did God make all men? It is surely plain to every man. How then are not all equal in respect of virtue and vice? whence are the good, and gentle, and meek? whence are the worthless and evil? For if these things do not require any purpose, but are of nature, how are the one this, the others that? For if by nature all were bad, it were not possible for any one to be good, but if good by nature, then no one bad. For if there were one nature of all men, they must needs in this respect be all one, whether they were to be this, or whether they were to be that. …“But wherefore did He at all make worthless men, when He might have made all men good? Whence then are the evil things?” saith he. Ask thyself; for it is my part to show they are not
of nature, nor from God…. … Didst thou once take by violence the things that belonged not to thee; and after this, subdued by pity, didst impart even of thine unto him that was in need? Whence then this change? Is it not quite plain it is from the mind, and the choice of will? (link)

Friday Files: Morison’s commentary on Romans 9

In James Morison’s commentary on Romans 9, he makes the three helpful points about God’s promise that the greater shall serve the lesser. First, it was not said of Rebecca but to her, second it should be translated greater/lesser, not elder/younger, and third it’s a prediction. He also makes the point that Jacob and Esau should be considered as Nations, not individuals and that God’s hating Esau means He loved and blessed Esau less than Jacob. Morison understands the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart to mean giving Pharaoh boldness to do what he already wanted to do by removing Pharaoh’s fear of the consequences.

Here’s Morison’s high level summary of the Romans 9-11:

“In chapter ix. the apostle opens his subject in a profoundly pathetic spirit. He shows, with great power of demonstration, that God has the sovereign right to confer His messianic favors upon whomsoever He pleases. God has liberty in relation to men. His hands were not tied by Judaism. As regards human organs of Divine communications, He was not restricted to the Hebrews. Far less was it the case that the Hebrews, when disloyal to the aim and ideal of their messianic relationship, and its peculiar institutions, could yet be entitled to special spiritual prerogatives, and a monopoly of the very highest messianic favors.

In chapter x. the apostle shows that the greatest messianic blessings are still, though not monopolisingly, available to his countrymen. They are as really available to them as to the most favored of the Gentiles.

In chapter xi. the apostle shows that the time is on the wing when his recreant countrymen will reconsider their ways, and their duty to the Saviour and to God. They will be grafted in again, and, shooting aloft, will take the lead among their fellow men. So that if their fall and dispersion have been over-ruled to the enrichment of the world, and their loss has contributed to the gain of the Gentiles, how much more shall the fullness of both Jews and Gentiles be for the elevation and enduring weal of the human race at large ! There will indeed be no necessitation of will, and no dislocation of the broad foundation-stones of moral accountability and character. But the power of the most powerful of motives will be unceasingly and increasingly wielded on and for all men everywhere, and by God Himself, until the earth be a new- earth and a clean earth, fit palace and home for the now exalted Redeemer and all His loyal people.”

Morison’s strengths are knowledge of Greek and Hebrew, knowledge of the literature on Romans 9 and sufficient detail (the work is 281 pages). After explaining chapter nine, he discusses various methods of interpretation Romans 9 including allegorical, national and historical.

Impersonal vs. Personal Possibilities

This post is a response to Steve Hays in our ongoing discussion of choice and determinism.

All Dan is doing here, and all that Dan is ever doing here, is to fault determinism because it isn’t libertarianism. He keeps acting as if determinism is deficient since the determinist can’t view “choice” in the same way a libertarian can. ...Dan has no capacity for critical detachment. He can’t bring himself to evaluate the opposing position on its own terms. All he does is to apply a libertarian yardstick to determinism, and–voila!–determinism comes up short if you measure it by a libertarian yardstick.

The first statement (that I am faulting determinism because it isn’t libertarianism) is somewhat true, but it would be better to say I fault determinism because I suspect it is libertarianism. I suspect determinists are inconsistent and retain libertarian notions. They say 'choose' meaning what everyone else does (selection between possible alternatives); but also hold to determinism, which conflicts with 'choose'. It seems Calvinsits use the normal ‘dictionary’ definition of choose but don’t follow this definition through to its logical conclusions.

The second statement (that I can’t bring myself to evaluate Calvinism on its own terms) is also somewhat true. The Calvinist concept of choice does not make sense to me – I await a clear and precise explanation as to what it is. So I keep looking for Calvinism to make sense; to explain what choose means. But I fail to see how Steve's card player example explains things. Meanwhile (absent a way of understanding the Calvinist concept of ‘choose’), I am beginning to suspect Calvinists are simply inconsistent - confusing themselves and others.

Dan: “I don't believe I am equivocating; given determinism, a person can’t choose otherwise and if one is a determinist, they can’t consistently think they can choose otherwise. I don't think the epistemic sense of ‘possible’ reconciles determinism with 'the ability to choose otherwise'.”

Steve: That condition is irrelevant to my example.

If the card player example wasn’t intended to support Steve's claim regarding the ability to choose otherwise, what’s its purpose?

Dan: “The card player example relates to the outcome of choices not choices (I said choose otherwise, not do otherwise). The epistemic sense of 'possible' relates to the execution of choices, not choices themselves. In fact, the card player example is twice removed from the choice itself. The card player chooses to take another card; his success or failure in that attempt is getting another card or not (i.e. does he have a heart attack while asking for one, or does a ceiling tile fall on the dealer's head...). Steve's example is about the outcome of the draw, not the draw itself. Further, the card player isn't thinking ‘is choosing to draw possible?’ (i.e. can I make the internal mental resolution?), he's thinking about the outcome of drawing another card, so his use of possible relates to outcomes of choices, not choices themselves.”

Steve: Since Dan has insisted on a very expansive definition of choice, which includes the outcome, Dan’s objection is inconsistent with his own definition: “I generally think of choices at three levels: 1) contemplation, 2) choice and 3) execution of choice.”

My definition doesn’t make Steve’s example relevant to Steve’s definition.

The explanatory power of Steve’s card player example seems dependent on a dissanalogous aspect of the example. The ‘possibility’ Steve talks about is downstream and doesn’t make direct contact with the choice, yet Steve uses the example to explain choice. Steve isn’t talking about the player drawing or not drawing, but rather the outcome of the draw. As Steve notes, the player's choice doesn’t alter the order of the deck, so while he chooses to draw or not, he doesn't choose the outcome.

The point is that the ‘possibility’ in the card player example is impersonal, and nor something the card player can effect. That's why this type of possibility isn't suitable for explaining choice.

Does a gambler look up the definition of “choice” in Webster’s before he plays poker?

The card player has some notion of what choice means.

Steve: But the “one possibility of a time” limitation is an objective limitation which is imposed on human agents by the nature of time itself–in conjunction with logical (in-)compossibilities. We cannot simultaneously make contrary choices. In some cases we can make successive contrary choices, but because contrary choices are mutually exclusive, you can only make one such choice at a time. That limitation is due to the nature of time itself, as well as what is logically compossible.

While two actuals are impossible, alternative possibilities are not. Steve seems to be speaking about two actuals, but my statement was about alternative possibilities.


Dan: “A determinist can't say (or think or imply) 'I know 20 is possible', if 20 is possible or 21 is possible and he doesn't know which.”

Steve: A determinist doesn’t have to think both A and B are live possibilities. Rather, he doesn’t know in advance which abstract possibility is concretely impossible.

It’s difficult to see how Steve’s comment is responsive or undermines my argument that one cannot positively assert twofold possibilities (even in the epistemic sense of possibility) without undermining determinism. The only way I could see Steve’s comment as being at all relevant would be if he is stressing the negative aspect – not knowing which is impossible (as opposed to thinking that given what I know this is logically possible). The problem is that Steve himself has used ‘possibilities’ in positive assertions, not just negative assertions. Using possibilities in positive assertions undermines determinism; as we have seen.

The card player can't form a positive assertion like: "given what I know these two things are possible" or "my information about these two things logically reconcile without contradiction". As soon as he does, he undermines libertarianism.

Dan: The basis of truth is causal. Causal forces outside the player and the player's causal power will determine the outcome. When we say someone can choose, we are making a positive assertion about an agent's causal abilities. We are saying what the agent can cause. Logical possibility relates to ideas, not persons. A truth can't reach out and grab you, constrain you or causally determine what you do, but a person might.

Steve: Like shuffling a deck of cards.

What does that have to do with the card player’s abilities? This really highlights the problem noted above. The ‘possibility’ in the card player example is impersonal, and nor something the card player can effect. Choice is a power of the agent, we choose what is within one's power.

We can’t transplant the epistemic sense of ‘possible’ in the card player example into the definition of choice. Steve can’t shift from third person to first. You can’t move from ‘chocolate is possible’ to ‘I can choose chocolate’. While you can move from 1st to 3rd, you can’t move from 3rd to 1st person. In other words; “I can choose chocolate’ entails that in light of my abilities ‘chocolate is possible’. But ‘chocolate is possible’ in an epistemic sense does not entail ‘I can choose chocolate’ and has nothing to do with the agent’s abilities.

Dan :“Finally, Steve looks for Greek and Hebrew word studies. I have already pointed out that modern scolorship is unanimously translates bâcha and eklegomai as choose.”

Steve: This goes back to Dan’s incorrible dishonesty. Yes, he pointed that out. And I responded to his rejoinder.When I respond to his rejoinder, what does he do? Does he acknowledge my response? No. He acts as if nothing was every said in response to his rejoinder.Dan can’t bring himself to argue in good faith. He keeps repeating the same stale arguments as if no one ever interacted with his argument.

This argument stalemated on the definition of choose; which is why I have been focusing on that.

Steve: A possible agent’s object of choice is not the same object as God’s object of choice. When we say that God chooses a possible world, what we mean is which possible world God choose to instantiate. Which possible world will become the real world.When we say what a possible agent chooses, that has reference to what a possible agent does in a possible world. It doesn’t mean a possible agent is choosing which possible world will become the real world. Due to Dan’s equivocation, Molinism continues to fall afoul of my objection: in the actual world, an actual agent isn’t free to choose between either A or B. Rather, the actual world actualizes either A or B. If it actualizes A, then B is no longer in play. If it actualizes B, then A is no longer in play. In Molinism, libertarian freedom only applies at the level of possible worlds, and not the actual world. An actual world actualizes one possibility to the exclusion of the others. That’s the point. That’s what distinguishes actuality from possibility. These alternatives are only live possibilities in possible worlds. In the real world, they cease to be live possibilities.

Again, I am not sure if Steve is attempting to describe Molinism or present a reductio ad absurdum argument. If he’s describing it, the description is inaccurate. Here’s a quote from Molina:

For the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not going to happen because they are foreknown by God as going to happen, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our freedom of choice – through if they were going to happen in a contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way the are in fact foreknown as going to happen – and, indeed the knowledge by which God knew absolutely that such and such things would come to be is not a cause of the things, but rather, once the order of things that we see has been posited by the free determination of the divine will, then (as Origen and the other Fathers observe) the effects will issue forth from their causes – naturally from natural causes, freely and contingently with respect to both parts from free causes – just as if God had no foreknowledge of future events. From this it clearly follows that no prejudice at all is done to freedom of choice or to the contingency of things by God’s foreknowledge, a
foreknowledge through which, because of the infinity and wholly unlimited perfection and acumen of His intellect, He sees with certainty what the free causes placed in any order of things will do, even though they could really, if they so willed do the contrary; rather, even though that knowledge exists, freedom of choice and the contingency of things with respect to both parts remains intact, just as if there were no foreknowledge. (Molina Translation by Freddoso. Concordia Disp 52 para 29.)

For more contemporary accounts, please see Flint and Craig’s response to Hasker and Adams anit-Molinist arguments.

So it’s wrong to say "in libertarian Molinism, freedom only applies at the level of possible worlds, and not the actual world".


While it’s true God is choosing the whole world, that world includes us choosing some small part of it. Further, God’s actualization of that possible world unfolds over time and in different modes – either directly (as in cases like creation and miracles…) or indirectly by permitting us to actualize parts of it in accordance to what He knew we would do.

So if Steve was explaining Molinism, the description was inaccurate, leaving ample room for developing faulty conclusions.

On the other hand, if Steve was providing a reducto ad absurdum argument against Molinism, it’s hard to tell just what it might be. When Steve says “the actual world actualizes either A or B” he substitutes ‘the actual world’ for people’s choices. It's like he's personifying the actual world. What are we to make of such an argument? The world doesn’t possess us, nor force our wills.

Steve: The other problem goes to basic contradiction within Molinism. On the one hand, Molinism tries to reconcile predestination with libertarian freedom. Possible agents are free to do otherwise, but God determines which possibility to instantiate.

Steve's statement "God determines which possibility to instantiate" could be taken in two ways. Determined may either be a mental resolution or deciding on a plan in our minds (in which cases Molinists agree with Steve's statement). What is determinate is God’s mind. But if Steve means God determines the possibility (what is determined is the world, not God’s mind), Molinists disagree.

Steve: On the other hand, Molinism says that God can choose from this array of possibilities because he knows what a human agent would do in any given situation. However, the conventional definition of libertarian freedom is the freedom to do otherwise in the very same situation.

Freedom to do otherwise in the very same situation isn’t a conventional definition of LFW, the normal definition is the ability to choose otherwise. Open theists use the ‘same situation’ definition since they have a tough time with the question ‘otherwise than what?’ Since they don’t hold to ‘a future’ they have a hard time saying we are free to choose otherwise than we will choose. So they go with freedom to do otherwise in the same situation.

Steve: So it turns on which side of the Molinist contradiction you want to accentuate. If you accentuate the libertarian side of the Molinist contradiction, then Dan has introduced a false dichotomy: “But in Molinism, if we would choose chocolate; God can't choose the possible world in which we choose vanilla.”

My statement isn’t a false dichotomy. It isn’t even a dichotomy.

Steve: Up to a point, that’s true, but quite deceptive. For if libertarianism is true, then there’s a possible world in which we choose chocolate, and another possible world in which we choose vanilla. If freedom means the freedom to do otherwise, then there’s a possible world which matches each alternative Therefore, even if we accept libertarianism, God is never confronted with a situation in which our choice restricts his choice.

I agree with Steve’s premise (two possible worlds), but the conclusion does not follow. God enables us to choose, so while we ultimately depend on His power, He can’t force us to choose something.

Steve: If you stipulate that freedom means the freedom to do otherwise, then you deny God unique ability to know what we’d do in any given circumstance. If what we will do could go either way, then our choice cannot be a determinate object of knowledge.

God knows the future, not by it being predetermined, but rather directly. We should not denigrate God's epistemology to our level.

Steve: Possible agents comprise different sets of serial choices. Different hypothetical timelines. Even if you say that successive choices are successively realized, that’s irrelevant to the fact that God is instantiating one series of possibilities to the exclusion of other series. God makes that call, not the possible agent. Even in Molinist terms, the real world has a closed future.

God is instantiating one of the possibilities indirectly, by permitting us to instantiate it in accordance with what He knew we would do.

Steve: A possible person is simply a divine concept. A mental construct. It’s not something over and above God’s conception, in relation to which God is dependent. To the contrary, a possible person is entirely dependent on divine cogitation.

A possible person is more than God’s conception in the same way an actual person is more than God’s actual power. So unless we embrace pantheism, we are in some way distinct from God.

Steve: Moreover, libertarian freewill assumes control over the outcome. That’s the point. Unless the decisions of the free agent effect the chosen outcome–he’s hardly free in a libertarian sense. It would be like pushing buttons on a vending machine in which you’re free to push any combination you like, but what you get doesn’t correspond to what you select. You select the Butterfinger Crisp, but you get the 3 Musketeers instead. Is that how Dan now defines “choice”?

The means were chosen (i.e. hitting the button) but the outcome was not. Sometimes multiple choices are spoken of as one, when they are working together to accomplish one purpose. When the chain breaks, one must distinguish between the various elements. Whether choice relates to multiple mental resolutions or multiple outcomes or both; in any case determinism is undermined. However, since God looks at the heart, moral responsibility attaches first and foremost to internal actions.

Friday Files: Joseph Benson's Commentary on Romans 9

In Joseph Benson's commentary on Romans 9, he explains that Paul's refutation of the Jews argument that God's word failed is twofold. Paul deals with national election and also with justification by faith. Benson explains the allegorical sense and justification by faith: "In quoting these words, in Isaac shall thy seed be called, and inferring therefrom that the children of the promise shall be counted for the seed, the apostle does not intend to give the literal sense of the words, but the typical only; and by his interpretation signifies that they were spoken by God in a typical and allegorical, as well as in a literal sense, and that God there declared his counsel concerning those persons whom he purposed to own as his children, and make partakers of the blessings of righteousness and salvation. As if he had said, This is a clear type of things to come; showing us, that in all succeeding generations, not the lineal descendants of Abraham, but they to whom the promise is made, that is, believers, are the true children of God.

Benson also explains the literal sense and national election. He does a good job at explain how national election squares with the question of did God's word fail. It may seem like national election would result in the Jews being saved, which would undermine Paul's point. So why reference the election of Jacob? Benson explains: "And his intent herein, as appears from verses 30-33, (which passage is a key to the whole chapter,) is evidently to show, that as God before chose Jacob, who represented the Jews, and admitted him and his posterity to peculiar privileges, above the Gentiles, without any merit in him or them to deserve it; so now, (the Jews through their unbelief having rejected the Messiah, and being justly therefore themselves rejected of God,) he had chosen the Gentiles, represented by Esau, to be his peculiar people; according to the prediction of Hosea, I fill call them my people, &c., cited verse 25, where see the note; and that without any thing on their part to deserve this favour. It was entirely free with respect both to them and Jacob, Cod's mercy and goodness preventing, not the endeavour only, but even the will of both. As, before Jacob either willed or strove for it, the blessing was designed of God for him; so, before ever the Gentiles sought after God, the blessings of Christ's kingdom were designed for them. Yet it does not follow that all who are called Christians, and enjoy outward church privileges, shall be finally saved, any more than it is to be concluded that all the Jews were saved before Christ came in the flesh, on account of their privileges." In other words, explaining that national election doesn't guarantee salvation is responsive to the Jews argument that the word of God failed.

Conversion and Continuation (Response to Steve)

Steve Hays recently called Arminians (and Josh in particular) hypocrites for not opposing my teaching eternal security. (link) It’s unclear if he means they should oppose eternal security (since he cites case where Josh does) or if Steve means they should oppose me personally. I normal don’t respond to things like this, but since Steve is accusations others (not me, thought Steve is involving me) I thought I should say something. Steve, please consider assuming a more charitable reason other than hypocrisy for the lack of personal opposition.

You’re free to enter, but not to leave. …Both getting saved and staying saved involve the exercise of faith. Believing the Gospel from day to day. Conversion doesn’t require a different sort of faith than the daily walk of faith. Conversion doesn’t require a different source of faith than the daily walk of faith.

Faith isn’t a choice; it’s a result of one. Repentance is a choice, but faith is not. So I disagree the inception and continuation of faith are the same.

On the other hand, we are warned about neglecting not just repudiating salvation (Heb 2:1-3). We can slip away, like a ring slipping off a finger. So while I am not suggesting we should be passive about perseverance or maintaining faith, I am suggesting conversion and continuation are asymmetrical. I think the way it works is that as we work, we see God working in our lives and it strengthens our faith.

What are the Scriptural prooftexts for libertarian freewill? Well, the warning passages of Scripture constitute a locus classicus. …If the warning passages don’t imply that a Christian is free to either persevere in the faith or lose his faith, then there’s no obstacle to saying the exact same thing about other libertarian prooftexts.

I don’t disagree with non-OSAS Arminians on warning passages. I disagree with them on security passages and also in systematization. But I do hold we can fall away, I just don’t think we will.

2 Audio Files Addressed to Moderate Calvinism

Here's a lecture by Ken Keathley (a Molinist) and one by Angus Stewart (a Classic Calvinist) addressed at moderate Calvinism. They cover topics such as supra vs. infra-lapsarianism, single vs. double predestination, a 'well meant offer', and defining hyper-Calvinism. Both find moderate Calvinism inconsistent and invite moderate Calvinists to consider their own positions. Both give excellent historical backgrounds for their views.

Predestination and Eternal Security

Calvinsts charge Arminians with making predestination irrelevant - something that doesn't impact life. If God already foreknew Bobby will believe in the future, predestination becomes a rubber stamp of what Bobby will do. It's already the future without predestination. Is this charge valid? Arminian views on predestination vary, but for some views (in my opinion those that most clearly and successfully avoid the charge) predestination seems to favor eternal security.


The first view that clearly shows how predestination impacts the world is the foreknowledge is or includes middle knowledge. In this view God chooses what circumstances to put someone in, knowing how they would freely respond. This clearly impacts the world, and equally clearly explains how God could prevent apostasy.


The second view the clearly shows how predestination impacts life is that predestination impacts the time after the foreknown event. Let's say predestination impacts Bobby's life from the moment of conversion on. God foresees Bobby will convert on June 2nd, and predestination effects the rest of his life. In this way, predestination is far from a rubber stamp. Now Bobby has a real world benefit he didn't have before - predestination. But predestination to what and what is this benefit? We are predestined to adoption as sons and to conformity to Christ's image and the benefit is that we are created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we would walk in them. Starting to sound like eternal security?


Let's look at some of the scriptural texts:


Romans 8: 28-30 And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose. For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom He predestined, these He also called; whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also glorified.


There doesn't seem to be any way around this. That all things work together for good to those who love God is often quoted to comfort those in pain. But either God is able to succeed in getting all things to work together for good, or He is not. If not, all comfort is lost. Those experiencing through troubles do not know God will work things out for their good - He might not succeed in His attempt to do so. If on the other hand, God will work things out for their good, the comfort is back but it brings eternal security along with it. It's not true that God is working all things for our good if we end up lost.


Further, those that are foreknown are predestined to conformity to Christ's image. Predestination has to do with the destination. If our destination is final glory, that's where we will end up. Apostates (if there are any) are outside this process - not addressed by Romans 8:28-30. With an exception that big, we have good reason to question if they were ever really saved.


Finally, those who are foreknown and predestined end up glorified. Some argue that since 'glorified' is in the past tense, it references regeneration which happens in this life. Without opposing this view, I would add to it that it must be regeneration in view of it's being the start to bringing completion of the process - final glory in heaven, because conformity to Christ's image starts in this life and completes in the next.

The passage continues:

31 What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? 32 He who did not spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things? 33 Who shall bring a charge against God’s elect? It is God who justifies. 34 Who is he who condemns? It is Christ who died, and furthermore is also risen, who is even at the right hand of God, who also makes intercession for us. 35 Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? 36 As it is written: “ For Your sake we are killed all day long; We are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.”37 Yet in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us. 38 For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, 39 nor height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Isn't God, who willingly gave us His Son, willing to keep us? The temptation Paul enumerates (tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword) are those most likely to lead us to apostatize from Christ. Yet Paul has no fear and speaks boldly that no created thing (that includes us) shall separate us from God's love. What's left? God Himself? Sin? OK, but the normal process (and our primary threat) is for temptations to lead us to sin and away from God. Why boast of victory, if the only threat isn't being addressed?

Let's look at what predestination does:

Ephesians 2:8-10 For by grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, not of works, lest anyone should boast. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we should walk in them.

Predestination is from foreknowledge and unto good works. God changes us and prepares the way before us. That's why we will preserver.

James White on Romans 9

I recently listened to James White's explanation of Romans 9. I was surprised by his technique. He did very little explaining of the scripture, or showing the connection between the text and Calvinism. Rather, he went verse-by-verse attacking non-Calvinist interpretations of the passage. White made very few positive assertions about what the text means; and none of them supported Calvinism. It was as if he assumed the passage teaches Calvinism and made no efforts to justify that claim. That's not exegesis and in debate it's a shift of the burden of proof.

So my biggest problem is with what he didn't do - justify Calvinism based on the text. However, I also had a problem with what he did do - attack the non-Calvinist position. Sometimes White confused with non-Calvinist interpretations of the passage and non-Calvinists reconciliation of the interpretation of the passage with the rest of their theology. He asks why the reconciliation isn't in the text itself, then charges his opponents with eisegesis. Also, I personally couldn't identify with his attacks of non-Calvinist explanations of the text. Sometimes made comments about the non-Calvinist position that I could agree with, but he always applied them in ways I wouldn't such that his presentation of the non-Calvinist position was unrecognizable to me. In short, I didn't find this explanation all that helpful.

Friday Files: Daniel Whedon's Comentary on Romans 9

In Daniel Whedon's Comentary on Romans 9, he argues that Paul's quotations of the old testament support the Arminian view of the passage. In some ways, I found Whedon to be a prototype of more recent Arminian explanations of the passage. Specifically, his digging into the context of "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy" in Exodus 32-33 was a big step in the right direction. Whedon explains the verses and then refutes Barnes' (a Calvinist) view. He notes the Calvinist interpretation of defending God's justice is really a "might makes right" kind of view. He objects: "Power increased infinitely cannot change right. A creature can be supposedly wronged by even an infinite being. The predesinarian interpretation makes Paul pretend to give a reason, but really resorts to force, and seeks to frighten his opponents out of reasoning."

Sheepkeeper

John 10:26-30 speaks of God's protection. Shank notes that 'following' in verse 27 is present active indicative - which could mean an ongoing action. His point seems to be that you have to follow in order to be protected and further sometimes sheep don't follow so they are unprotected and end up lost. (Shank. Life in the Son. p. 56-60)I derive a different conclusion - Christ's sheep do follow. Let's look at the passage.

In John 10:1-6 Christ says that sheep won't follow a stranger, but they follow the shepherd.

In John 10:7-8 Christ says others came before, but they were thieves and robbers and the sheep didn't hear them; basically indicating the true Israel was not led astray by false prophets.

In John 10:9-18 Christ explains that He is the door through which any man can enter and the good shepherd that lays His life down for the sheep.

In John 10:19-21 the crowd reacts - some oppose Jesus but others say "can a demon open the eyes of the blind?" This hearkens back to chapter 9's account of Jesus healing a the bind man.

John 10:22-24 says: Now it was the Feast of Dedication in Jerusalem, and it was winter. And Jesus walked in the temple, in Solomon’s porch. Then the Jews surrounded Him and said to Him, “How long do You keep us in doubt? If You are the Christ, tell us plainly.”

About 2 months had passed and the Jews ask Jesus if He was the Christ. This seems to be a trap since He they were already aware of His claim to being the Messiah. In chapter 8 Christ said before Abraham was, I AM and the Jews tried to kill him.

In John 10:25-27 Christ responds: “I told you, and you do not believe. The works that I do in My Father’s name, they bear witness of Me. 26 But you do not believe, because you are not of My sheep, as I said to you. 27 My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me.

The Pharisees asked Jesus "are you the Christ"? He basically says "I already told you and you still don't believe. Further, my miracles back up what I say."

The Pharisees didn't believe Christ because there were not his sheep (John 10:26). At this point Calvinists commentaries start waxing eloquent about unconditional election; but is that what Christ is saying? I don't think so, but the explanation of what it does mean undermines Shank's point.

I think it's fair to look at two different witnesses here: Christ's word and His miracles. First, Jesus told them He is Christ, and now He is backing it up through miracles. The Pharisees do not believe now, because they did not believe (and become sheep) then. If they had become sheep, they would have recognized Christ as their Sheppard and would have had a sheepish attitude which is disposed to follow. The sheep follow Christ's voice.

It’s important to understand that there are two witnesses: 1) Christ’s word and 2) the works He does in the Fathers name that bear witness to what He has said.

Jesus answered them, "I told you [1], and you do not believe. The works that I do in my Father’s name bear witness about me [2], 2but you do not believe because you are not part of my flock.

They reject #2 now, because they had rejected #1 before. But those that accepted #1 before became sheep and now follow (v 27). In this specific case, the work Christ did was healing the blind man.

Christ's sheep do follow (i.e. conversion leads to discipleship). Anyone can come through the door (Christ) and join the flock. (John 10:9) They then hear Christ's voice and follow. So when Christ says His sheep follow, He is making a simple statement about the sheep; they preserver.

In John 10:28-30, Christ says: And I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish; neither shall anyone snatch them out of My hand. My Father, who has given them to Me, is greater than all; and no one is able to snatch them out of My Father’s hand. I and My Father are one.”

All sins are some combination of temptation from without and willingness from within us. Satan's modus operandi isn't to overpower God, but rather to tempt us and lure us away from Him. If Satan were to draw us away from God (ultimately), then Satan defeated God. But that will never happen, because God's protecting hand on His sheep is too strong for Satan get us.

Thus we have 5 affirmations of eternal security: 1) Christ's sheep follow Him, 2) He gives them eternal life, 3) they shall never perish, 4) No one can take them from Christ's hand, 5)No one can take them from the Father's hand.

Index to Debate on Calvinism and Determinism

Here's a recap of a debate I had with Theojunkie and Turretinfan on Calvinism and determinism. The debate cover all kinds of topics, like determinism and Molinism but one aspect that we kept coming back to was Christ's death and determinism. Here's some key quotes and links to the posts:

Opening Argument: Calvinism is Determinism - A brief review of TULIP in light of Determinism Christ's death was sufficient for all meaning if He had died for the reprobate, He could have been able to save them. The "possibility" of salvation is based on a different past then the actual past - a hallmark of determinism.


Theojunkie Response 1 If Christ had died for the reprobate, then 1) they would with certainty be saved, and 2) they would not be reprobate. Salvation is not "possible" for anybody-- it is certain. No where does the bible speak of the "possibility of being saved". No where does anyone in the bible present the Gospel as a "possibility" for a person. Therefore, nothing here is based on a false history.


My Response How could Christ’s not dying for someone be the basis of His death’s being sufficient for them? Further, you deny that salvation is possible for anyone, but rather that it is certain (presumably for the elect and them alone). This implies that Christ is unable to save the non-elect. If Christ is unable to save them, how then is His death sufficient for them?One way to explain it would be that given the hypothetical that they were elected, Christ wouldn’t have had to suffer any more? (i.e. an alternative past to correspond to the alternative future). There’s a power or possibility in Christ’s death that’s accessed with an alternative past.

Theojunkie Response 2 "Christ not dying for someone" is not the "basis for his death being sufficient for all." The basis for saying that Christ's death is sufficient for all, is simply this: He is the spotless lamb of God.

Turretinfan Response 1 GIMJ claims that Calvinism teaches, "The "possibility" of salvation [based on the sufficiency of Christ's death] is based on a different past then the actual past ... ." This is not true, either, because the sufficiency of Christ's death is a matter of intrinsic value. Christ's death is in actuality sufficient for all the sins of each and every person.

Response to TF 1 Yes, but I suspect that your very concept of “actual sufficiency” with respect to a counterfactual future (i.e. the salvation of the non-elect) entails a counterfactual past. When determinists claim we are able to do otherwise, if we had chosen to, or we are able to choose otherwise, if we had wanted to; they are defining “ability” in terms of a counterfactual past. For more please see here. Can Christ save the reprobate? Under Calvinism, in one sense He can and in another sense He cannot. The sense He cannot is obvious. Given the Father didn’t elect them, Christ would almost have to “freak out” and run contrary to the Father to do so. Obviously that can’t happen. But the sense in which He can relies on a counterfactual past in which they were not reprobate.

Turretinfan Response 2 As I already said, "actual sufficiency" has to do with intrinsic value. To build on the Scriptural analogy of redemption with a price, the price of Christ's death was enough to save an infinite number of people. The question of people's choice is really irrelevant to the issue of Christ's sufficiency. If only Paul had been elected, Christ's death would have been exactly as sufficient as it is in reality.


Response to TF 2 This explanation wouldn’t be an issue if Calvinists only said the value of Christ’s death was sufficient for all. But they say Christ’s death was sufficient for all [meaning the value of Christ’s death was sufficient for all], while in the background, other aspects of Christ’s death move against Christ’s death being sufficient for all. Granted, these other aspects don’t “block” the value of Christ’s death from saving, but perhaps they make use of the value of Christ’s death in such a way that the reprobate remain unsavable. If the reprobate are unsavable, clearly Christ’s death was insufficient for them. Something more than the value of Christ’s death is required. This article suggest that the “something more” is intention, and that intention is implied in the phrase sufficient for all. (link) But whatever the “something else” is, if something more is required from X for Y, X is insufficient for Y. This is why I suspect you are speaking in a divided sense.

Turretinfan Response 3 GIMJ's argument glosses over the difference between sufficiency and savability. The price is sufficient to save, but is not used to that end. To go back to the ransom analogy, if the cost to ransom any and all captives is $1 Million, then a payment of $1 Million is sufficient for all, even if it is not intended or used to free all the captives.... Intention is not something "added" to Christ's death to make it sufficient - it is not even, itself, the thing that makes the death of Christ efficient. It is the "joy that was set before him," as Scripture teaches. The act of offering is what makes the sacrifice efficient, and the Holy Spirit actually executes the effect in the life of the elect.


Response to TF 3 Owens says God lays the sins of the elect on Christ first, then Christ carries them to the cross and pays the price, actually satisfying justice through His death. The intention, sin transfer, offering, and acceptance are all required. Without them, Christ’s death would not, and could not save anyone. As it stands, you seem to hold to the contradiction that the value of Christ’s death is both sufficient and it requires something else.

Friday Files: Beet's Commentary on Romans 9

In Joseph Agar Beet's commentary on Romans 9 (pages 255 -288 in his A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans) he explains that Paul is teaching that God's plan was to save through the Gospel not the Law. Beet is a good author - he asks good questions and gets right to the point. I love the way he explains why the word 'faith' doesn't appear in the first part of the text. "Paul puts, not faith, but Him that calls, in contrast to works. For God's purpose is no more a result of faith than of works." The objection in verse 14 is that "we are working so hard and God is letting in believers who hadn't been previously working". Paul responds by explaining God is being merciful, so merit doesn't come into play. Beet sees hardening as a punishment for prior sins that makes obedience more difficult, but not impossible. Beet sees the multiple hardenings in the Exodus account of Pharaoh as making obedience more and more difficult. But God hardens through longsuffering by showing them the way to salvation, so they have no right to complain.

Don't let me get me

God is both willing (John 6:39) and able to preserve us (Jude 24). To this Robert Shank responds "Our keeping ourselves in His love, in full anticipation of the mercy of our Saviour unto eternal life, is prerequisite to his safekeeping of our souls. We can trust Christ to save us, and we can trust Him to keep us; but we must trust Him." (Shank. Life in the Son. p. 279) But as Pink said: "I’m a hazard to myself, Don’t let me get me, I’m my own worst enemy". If God's not protecting us from ourselves, He's not protecting us. God saves us from the inside out.

Shank is really right about one thing and really wrong about another. We do need to trust Christ, but that's not an a prerequisite for His protection - faith is the instrument of His protection (1 Peter 1:5). Peter understood Christ's protection through experiencing trials; trials he failed but his faith failed not due to Christ's intercession (Luke 22:31-32). Shank sees Peter as a special case "that does not govern what may be true in other instances". (Shank p. 360) But the problem is twofold: 1) we see that faith is God's tool to protect us not something God requires before He will protect us and 2) if God could protect Peter through faith, He can protect us through faith. Shank grants that God is willing to protect us: "It is not the Father's will that any who come to Jesus should subsequently be lost." (Shank p. 360) So if He's willing and able, what's the hold up?

God promises not only the end (eternal life), but also the means (His protecting of our faith). He will "keep us strong" (1 Cor 1:7-9). Again, Shank puts the cart before the horse. He says: "The great promises of the faithfulness of God in performing His work of grace in our hears by His Spirit until the day of Jesus Christ all assume a corresponding faithfulness on the part of man." (Shank. p 110) But God's grace is what keeps us strong. He keeps us blameless (1 Thess 5:23-24). He strengthens us and protects us from the evil one (2 Thess 3:3). He will carry out His work in us (Phil 1:6). God doesn't wait on us to be faithful to protect us; He protects us by keeping us faithful.