Comments on Arminian Chronicles: Critique of Edwards’ View of the Will

Hi Robert,I had said:Preference is synonymous with...

2008-05-06T21:20:03.921-04:00

Hi Robert,

I had said:Preference is synonymous with choice. It’s not that preference causes choice, but rather preference is choice. Choice (or preference) is the act of the will, and it follows the last dictate of the understanding. So again, it’s not preference > choice, but rather understanding > choice (where preference = choice).

Hum... this probably was unclear, but I was actually trying to summarize Edwards' view, not state my own. Calvinists today try to summarize Edwards view as choosing according to our strongest desire, but that's not what Edwards said. Edwards didn't think desires (or preferences) cause choices. He thought reason, not desire, causes choices. Today's Calvinists seem to missunderstand Edwards on this point.

Edwards has to borrow the concept of having a choice from the noncalvinist, to speak about having choices because his own system eliminates the possibility of us ever having choices.

That's exactly right.

God be with you,
Dan

James wrote:“Using layman's terms - let's say a th...

2008-05-05T00:49:01.433-04:00

James wrote:

“Using layman's terms - let's say a thief breaks into my home tonight and aims a shotgun at my head, telling me he wants all my cash, credit cards, jewels, etc. Do I have a desire to give him my possessions? Not exactly, but I do have a desire to live. Grasping the situation intellectually, my preference - greater preference / desire (what Edwards says is "most agreeable" - is to live, so I hand over my possessions.”

So you are confronted with a situation as described. You are also confronted with a choice that involves multiple accessible alternatives including: give up the possessions to not be killed; believe he is “bluffing” and refuse to give over the possessions; if you are skilled in martial arts and see an opportunity to disarm him refuse to give over the possessions and make an attempt to disarm him; if you are suicidal push him to kill you by taunting him, etc. etc. One of these possibilities will be actualized by you, will be your choice and will actualize a particular possibility while excluding other possibilities.

In other words, you face a choice, you have a choice and will then make a choice.

I believe that when we make choices we do so in line with our “importances” (my term for the fact we do things in line with what we consider important; e.g. if you want to live that is an importance that you may act upon and so choose to give up the possessions, or you may believe it important to disarm such a person because you have years of special training and do not want them to get away with a crime, etc. etc.). Now our importances do not necessitate or cause our actions, but when we choose to act we choose to act in line with them.
So in James’ example, if you **have** a choice you have multiple alternatives accessible to you, which you can actualize. And whichever possibility you choose to actualize, YOU will be the cause, YOU will be the factor that determines which possibility will be actualized.

Edwards said we did what we did because of our nature. But our “nature” never makes a choice, WE DO. Edwards said we act from our strongest desire. But WE DETERMINE which desire will be strongest. What makes one desire “stronger” than another? We do. When there are competing desires attached to different courses of action, as in this example, what factor makes some desires weaker and some stronger and one the strongest? I would say the person himself, determines which is the weakest, which is the strongest. No matter what he ends up choosing, his choice will be in line with his importances. And we choose what will be most important to us in a particular situation. So WE are the determining factor, the cause of our own intentional actions. And it is because WE are the source of the action, the factor that caused one possibility to be actualized rather than another, that WE can be held responsible for our actions.

Where Edwards really missed the boat is that his system of theology, which involves the claim that God predetermines every even that occurs, precludes us from ever having a choice. And yet he talks about having preferences and choices. If Edwards’s system is true then we never face a choice where we could actualize different possibilities in the same situation (we never have what some have called “contra-causal” freedom, or more simply, we never ever have a choice, we can never do otherwise than we were predetermined to do). So Edwards if he is consistent with his system, cannot speak about **having** a choice, about why one possibility is actualized by a choice and not another. Returning to James' example, if it is predetermined that I do not give my possessions to the intruder and die for it, then it was impossible for me to actualize the possibility of giving him my possessions in order to live (to do that I would be doing something other than what God had predetermined what I would do, which if exhaustive predeterminism is true, would be impossible). But if I can only make the choice of not giving up my possessions and dying for it, then I never had a choice. Edwards’ system cannot allow for us ever having choices, so in terms of explaining why we do make the choices we do when we have choices is useless.

Edwards has to borrow the concept of having a choice from the noncalvinist, to speak about having choices because his own system eliminates the possibility of us ever having choices. It should again be noted that situations as described by James involving us **having** choices, cannot exist or occur in a world where every event is predetermined by God.

“Just an extra note - I've been forced to consider Edwards' use of the term "Arminian" because of his context. This came about when I was working on my dissertation and I discussed the Edwards section with Iain Murray. Murray noted that the "Arminianism" faced (and detested) by Edwards was a much more Deistic, non-supernatural form of belief than what is actually held by the likes of Arminius, Wesley, etc.”

One of the reasons why I believe that Edwards is not very helpful today for contemporary discussions, is stated clearly here: his arguments were against the weakest versions of LFW imaginable. Edwards did not take on the agent causation theory/LFW of Thomas Reid, Alvin Plantinga, J. P. Moreland, Roderick Chisolm, John Searle, Timothy O’Connor, William Rowe, etc. etc. Its like Edwards pitched against minor leaguers and never actually pitched against major league competition.

Dan wrote:

“Preference is synonymous with choice. It’s not that preference causes choice, but rather preference is choice. Choice (or preference) is the act of the will, and it follows the last dictate of the understanding. So again, it’s not preference > choice, but rather understanding > choice (where preference = choice).”

If preference is synonymous with choice, then whenever we make a choice we are making a preference of one possibility rather than another. But if we are facing such a situation where we can prefer (or choose) one possibility over another possibility (or vice versa) then is it not true that in that situation we HAVE A CHOICE?

And if we have a choice in that situation, then is it also true that that choice is not predetermined (because if that selection is predetermined then we did not **have** a choice)?

And if that choice is not predetermined but could go either way, then is it not true that the claim that all events are predetermined (as Edwards believed) is false?

Robert

Dear James,Looking back at Edwards' discussion of ...

2008-04-28T22:03:53.404-04:00

Dear James,

Looking back at Edwards' discussion of the nature of the will, I still believe he affirms that what I am calling "desire," he would say is "preference." He argues, in fact, that no volition exists without preference (I.I). Edwards writes that the will "always follows the last dictate of the understanding" (perception, not merely reason or judgment) (I.II). Thus, an intellectual grasp of a situation is tied to one's preference.

This is close to the way I understand Edwards but not quite right. Let’s see… regarding preference…

Preference is synonymous with choice. It’s not that preference causes choice, but rather preference is choice. Choice (or preference) is the act of the will, and it follows the last dictate of the understanding. So again, it’s not preference > choice, but rather understanding > choice (where preference = choice).

Why does this matter? Let’s look at Edwards’ description of freedom and compare it to RC Sproul’s characterization of Edwards.

Edwards said: Freedom is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases.(1.5)

Sproul characterizes Edwards as: “the ability to choose what we want” – Chosen by God, p 54

Edwards is saying: choose > do, Sproul is saying desire > choose. Edwards is talking about an ability to execute what we choose, Sproul is talking about an ability to choose. Edwards is talking about a freedom of the body, Sproul is talking about a freedom of the will.

That's a good point about the way Edwards is defining Arminian. I understand one of his "Arminian" opponents, Dr. Whitby, had some problems with Arianism.

God be with you,
Dan

Or even late afternoon. ;)Looking back at Edwards...

2008-04-28T18:07:21.800-04:00

Or even late afternoon. ;)

Looking back at Edwards' discussion of the nature of the will, I still believe he affirms that what I am calling "desire," he would say is "preference." He argues, in fact, that no volition exists without preference (I.I). Edwards writes that the will "always follows the last dictate of the understanding" (perception, not merely reason or judgment) (I.II). Thus, an intellectual grasp of a situation is tied to one's preference.

Using layman's terms - let's say a thief breaks into my home tonight and aims a shotgun at my head, telling me he wants all my cash, credit cards, jewels, etc. Do I have a desire to give him my possessions? Not exactly, but I do have a desire to live. Grasping the situation intellectually, my preference - greater preference / desire (what Edwards says is "most agreeable" - is to live, so I hand over my possessions.

I believe this is the essence of Edwards' argument.

The terms I'm employing, namely "liberty" and "free will," I put in quotes because of some of the differences in the terms which are employed by Edwards and Augustine (though, again, I believe they are arguing the same thing essentially). Edwards, for example, speaks of "Liberty" in the context of his day - what we might call "individual autonomy" in our context.

Just an extra note - I've been forced to consider Edwards' use of the term "Arminian" because of his context. This came about when I was working on my dissertation and I discussed the Edwards section with Iain Murray. Murray noted that the "Arminianism" faced (and detested) by Edwards was a much more Deistic, non-supernatural form of belief than what is actually held by the likes of Arminius, Wesley, etc.

Guess I'll be picking up Edwards this evening... :...

2008-04-28T17:12:54.860-04:00

Guess I'll be picking up Edwards this evening... :)

Dear James,I concede that Edwards speaks of desire...

2008-04-27T17:02:51.641-04:00

Dear James,

I concede that Edwards speaks of desire, etc., as the center of the will, and thereby argues about how the will is bound by those desires (not merely neutral).

This is very interesting. You’re the third Calvinist I’ve seen make this claim about Edwards (i.e. the will is bound by desires). R. C. Sproul makes this claim in Chosen by God (p 53 & 54) and Theojunkie (see the link to his blog) made this claim as well… This claim doesn’t seem to be based on Edwards’ book on the freedom of the will. Edwards’ model seems to be: reason > choice not desire > choice. For Edwards, the will is bound by motive, which is a function of reason.

God be with you,
Dan

Dan:You may be right on the point about Turretin. ...

2008-04-25T14:22:40.598-04:00

Dan:
You may be right on the point about Turretin. I need to begin reading him more....

I concede that Edwards speaks of desire, etc., as the center of the will, and thereby argues about how the will is bound by those desires (not merely neutral). However (and I'm probably reading this through my Augustinian lens), I don't think this necessarily negates what would be defined as "free will."

Sometimes we just have to work through the terms we've become so accustomed to, don't we?

Brother, I appreciate your spirit and am glad we can peacefully chat about these matters.

Dear James,I believe that both are correct in asse...

2008-04-24T21:04:15.402-04:00

Dear James,

I believe that both are correct in asserting "free will" and distinguishing it from "liberty."

A close reading of Edwards’ book reveals he doesn’t use the term freewill…except to argue against it. I would be interested if you could produce a counter example, but based on my research, I feel fairly comfortable saying Edwards didn’t believe in free will.

Rather, he believed in the freedom of the body to execute the will’s command. If your body can overpower your opposition, you are free. If not, you not free. But freedom (for Edwards) always modifies “you” and never your “will”. Your will isn’t free, your body is.

I need to research Augustine more.

Where will "Calvinists" be able to turn if not to Owen or Edwards? We'll turn where we always have, to the Scriptures!

No question about that! But here’s where I am going with this…

The three common views are: 1) LFW 2) Compatiblism and 3) Hard Determinism. #3 isn’t an option for Christians, because the bible says we have wills and make choices. So for us it’s down to 2 options. So if compatiblism is incoherent, then LFW is the last man standing and therefore the biblical option.

That’s why I am going through Edwards, because he is usually spoken of as the strongest Calvinist on this point. I actually don’t think he’s the strongest Calvinist on this point. I think Francis Turretin is, and his explanation is quite different than Edwards. But Edwards is cited more often than Turretin.

God be with you,
Dan

Also, as to Edwards, I'm not sure what you are say...

2008-04-24T14:59:26.224-04:00

Also, as to Edwards, I'm not sure what you are saying in relation to his understanding of God's will. God always has "free will" in the sense that "Our God is in the heavens, He does whatever He pleases." However, He never does anything contrary to His ultimate desires or His nature. For example, God cannot lie.

You're not going to believe this, but I disagree w...

2008-04-24T14:57:44.397-04:00

You're not going to believe this, but I disagree with you. ;)

Edwards sounds very, very similar to Augustine on this point. I believe that both are correct in asserting "free will" and distinguishing it from "liberty." I also think it is important to distinguish this form of "free will" from the monstrosity of "human autonomy" that prevails within the contemporary evangelical context.

Where will "Calvinists" be able to turn if not to Owen or Edwards? We'll turn where we always have, to the Scriptures! ;)

Dear Truehope,Edwards view is a bit complex. The ...

2008-04-19T07:07:36.615-04:00

Dear Truehope,

Edwards view is a bit complex. The best analogy for his view on freedom comes from a political issue of his day - slavery. Edwards thought we are free in the sense that someone who isn't a slave is free. This view of freedom is accurate, but insufficient to say the will is free.

Good question on His view of God. Edwards said God doesn't have freewill. For Edwards, freewill is illogical, so therefore God couldn't have it. Further, Edwards argued that we only think it's impious to say God doesn't have freewill, because we think freewill is a good thing, but it's not. Edwards explains God's sovereignty, in that God determines everything [even though He couldn't have determined it to be otherwise]. I think this view has big problems.

Thanks for asking.

God be with you,
Dan

Dear Robert,Yep, Edwards is their go to guy on the...

2008-04-19T06:59:19.386-04:00

Dear Robert,

Yep, Edwards is their go to guy on the will, although, from what I can tell what Edwards taught is a little different than modern Calvinism.

God be with you,
Dan

I don't understand Edward's position even after re...

2008-04-18T15:11:49.170-04:00

I don't understand Edward's position even after reading your post, because IMO his position is quite different from what the Bible teaches on this subject.

Dan, maybe you can explain this to me: in Edward's arguments against free will as he defines it, did Edward also deny that God has free will as well? If so, how did Edwards demonstrate that God who has no free will can still be considered sovereign? And if not, how did Edwards differentiate the will of God and the will of angels and humans?

Great to see you taking on Edwards here. Many cal...

2008-04-17T14:17:45.351-04:00

Great to see you taking on Edwards here. Many calvinists like to go to Owen's arguments for limited atonement (which you have already wiped out in your previous series on Owen's book and arguments). For free will they like to appeal to Edwards' book on the will so it's great that you are taking that on now. After dispensing with Edwards' feeble arguments, where will the calvinists be able to turn? :-) You will have eliminated their crutches, they won't have much to lean on after that! What you are doing will also provide great ammunition for other noncalvinists who have to hear the same Owenesque and Edwardsian arguments. Great work, keep up the good work.

Robert