Comments on Arminian Chronicles: The Main Reason I am a Molinist

Robert on December 1st at 6:01 p.m. wrote, " ...

2009-12-07T10:28:52.004-05:00

Robert on December 1st at 6:01 p.m. wrote, " We know that the future is knowable because again God has shown this ability throughout scripture. If God does it as he does in the bible, then it is logically possible."

It's not a dogmatic assertion, is a definitional issue. Open theists define and analyse knowledge of the future differently than simple forknowledge theorists or Molinists. Different analyses and definitions are permissible so long as they are rationally justified.

The Bible does not define God's foreknowledge as only consistent with the Molinist view or the simple foreknowledge view. Different interpretations of the relevant scriptures are rationally justifiable and so available to believers. Hence it is not true, (from the open future theorist view) that God's knowledge of the future is only as Robert defines and describes it.

Of course Robert may disagree with the interpretation of scripture by the open future theorists, but all that means is that the argument between him and open future theorists must be resolved at that level.

Given the interpretation of scripture by open future theorists, it is valid for SOME of them to say that knowledge of the future is illogical and irrational and thus the future is unknowable. It is also important to remember that not all open future theorists argue that the future is unknowable.

Because Robert and I do not yet agree on the distinction between working assumptions, there is no point in responding to his other comments as to do so would be as ships passing in the night.

The open future theorist arguement follows from their definitions and analysis of the future. Robert can argue that it's premises or assumptions are wrong or untrue, or that the argument is incoherent illogical. However, he cannot prove that it is wrong using HIS assumptions or premises.

regards,
#John

Hello John (part 2) “Nope. But the disagreement a...

2009-12-04T18:02:47.354-05:00

Hello John (part 2)

“Nope. But the disagreement about whether future events are properly described as "might / might not" or "will / will not" is part of the philosophical debate about this topic.”

Again, open theists begin with an a priori (i.e. that God does not and cannot know the future as ordinarily understood) and then they look for philosophical arguments to bolster their guiding and controlling presupposition. It is similar to compatibilists who begin assuming that God predetermines all events, and then redefine free will so that it lines up with their presupposition (free will then does not mean that you have choices but only that when you make a choice you are doing what you want to do, that you were not coerced in your action).

People just reading the bible without these philosophical axes to grind will conclude that we sometimes have free will as ordinarily understood and that God foreknows the future as ordinarily understood.

“Robert believes that God is outside time and exists in the future just as much as in the past. That is one way, but not the only way of describing it.”

God created everything including matter and energy which is what space and time comes from. Time is part of our created universe and God is an eternal being. His relation to time is going to be different than ours. And if viewed dimensionally while we experience some dimensions, God would experience them all, so again his relation to what we call time is going to be very different. God is not just a bigger man, but a being that transcends the creation.

“It is not something that can be derived from the Bible but something that must be brought to the Bible.”

Disagree, from statements in the bible we deduce that God created everything, including matter and energy which are not eternal and are the basis of space and time. It is from the bible that we know that God alone is eternal, that all other realities are created and temporal realities. So no it is not importing something from outside the bible into the bible but taking the bible statements about God and deriving conclusions from those.

“I don't believe that God any longer exists without time or that he exists in the future or that he is somehow outside of time and sees an "actual" future that is as real as the present.”

You don’t want to believe it because it goes against your preferred theology. But your preferred theology is constructed upon your own definitions and redefining ordinary usage of terms and also mistaken interpretation of biblical texts (I am quite aware of how open theists reinterpret biblical texts; it is similar to how calvinists reinterpret the “all” statements to fit their theology, likewise, open theists reinterpret biblical texts dealing with God’s knowledge of the future).

“My description of reality is just as consistent with the Biblical text as Robert's, so it is not the Bible that will assist in choosing between the two descriptions of reality.”

I believe you are mistaken here. Most bible believers hold to the fact that God knows the future because the bible clearly presents texts showing this. And the issue is not whether or not your view is compatible with scripture but is it true? Calvinists would claim their interpretations are compatible with scripture as well, but their interpretations are mistaken.

“I would argue that my description is more compatible with a natural reading of the texts (i.e., the texts do not assume the reality of a fully determined future), but the text is not conclusive either way.”

Actually the text is pretty clear which is why most Christians are not open theists. Same goes with Calvinism: the texts are clear so most Christians are not Calvinists. It is interesting that both open theists and calvinists are the groups reinterpreting biblical texts and arriving at conclusions that are contradicting what the church as a whole has always believed.

Robert

Hello John, (part 1) “Incorrect, and that is the ...

2009-12-04T18:01:36.550-05:00

Hello John, (part 1)

“Incorrect, and that is the point that open theists make. Knowledge of a future libertarian causally free choice is not logically knowable, and is therefore illogical and thus something that is not knowable.”

This is just a dogmatic assertion made by open theists. We know that the future is knowable because again God has shown this ability throughout scripture. If God does it as he does in the bible, then it is logically possible.

“The point is that the future is not something that is inherently knowable regardless of how it is defined, but rather its knowability depends on how it is defined.”

It is open theists who come along and redefine things to make knowledge of the future impossible. It is an attempt at truth by definition and persuades only those who are so defining things.

“The examples of God "knowing" the future are examples of Him announcing what He will make happen.”

In some cases (e.g. the visible second coming of Jesus, Yes), but not in cases involving freely chosen human actions (e.g. the foretelling that Judas would betray Jesus).

“God is the kind of being that can make whatever He wants to happen, happen.”

True and this being that can make whatever He wants to happen decided that mankind would have free will (meaning that at least some of our actions result from libertarian free will, and these actions are not unilateral actions where God controls the future).

“If God does not want a messenger to reach the king, He can do it by "over-riding" free will or by causing the horse to stumble and fall over a cliff, or causing an angel to block the way and having a donkey speak, etc.”

And if God knows that in the future there will be a messenger and knows the message and knows he will be riding a horse, wouldn’t God need to know these future realities in order to plan that in the future he would cause the horse to stumble or send an angel to block the way? And if he knows these future things then it is again evidence that he does in fact know the future.

“Incorrect, though it depends on how one defines "facts" and so different kinds of open theists would address this issue differently.”

Again open theism is a view based on carefully redefining things with meanings conducive to open theism.

“So, regarding your example of the game, God's knowledge of you future attendance consists of "Robert might or might not go to the game".”

This is again an example of open theists redefining things. I believe it was Greg Boyd that invented the “might or might not” language, while the rest of us refer to future events as “will or will not happen”.

Robert

Robert wrote, "Again it is wrong to say about...

2009-12-04T12:08:40.835-05:00

Robert wrote, "Again it is wrong to say about my going to the game on Friday night that either I might or might not (I either will or will not)."

Nope. But the disagreement about whether future events are properly described as "might / might not" or "will / will not" is part of the philosophical debate about this topic. Many philosophers, but not all, agree with you and argue that the future should be described as "will / will not". Each description is defensible, but I believe that the "might / might not" description is the stronger, more defensible description.

Robert believes that God is outside time and exists in the future just as much as in the past. That is one way, but not the only way of describing it. It is not something that can be derived from the Bible but something that must be brought to the Bible. I don't believe that God any longer exists without time or that he exists in the future or that he is somehow outside of time and sees an "actual" future that is as real as the present.

My description of reality is just as consistent with the Biblical text as Robert's, so it is not the Bible that will assist in choosing between the two descriptions of reality. I would argue that my description is more compatible with a natural reading of the texts (i.e., the texts do not assume the reality of a fully determined future), but the text is not conclusive either way.

regards,
#John

Robert on Dec. 3, at 12:09 wrote, "But knowin...

2009-12-04T11:59:43.122-05:00

Robert on Dec. 3, at 12:09 wrote, "But knowing the future is not the same as knowing something that is false or a logical impossibility."

Incorrect, and that is the point that open theists make. Knowledge of a future libertarian causally free choice is not logically knowable, and is therefore illogical and thus something that is not knowable. Of course one can define future knowledge in a way that is logical (e.g., either simply assert and thus assume that God knows the future, or have some theory such as "God is outside time"), and so define the future as something that is knowable.

The point is that the future is not something that is inherently knowable regardless of how it is defined, but rather its knowability depends on how it is defined. How the future is defined depends on what someone thinks the future is composed of, or the nature of its existence. As a presentists, I do not think that the future "exists" t all.

Robert writes, "Why is it “nonsensical” if God has done it already before? It is not as if the bible contains no examples of God knowing a future event involving human choices."

The examples of God "knowing" the future are examples of Him announcing what He will make happen. It's like me saying to my friend that tomorrow I will go to work and then the next day I call my friend from work. In order to make my "prediction" I didn't have to know the future, but I did have to be able to control events to make my desired future happen.

God is the kind of being that can make whatever He wants to happen, happen. If God does not want a messenger to reach the king, He can do it by "over-riding" free will or by causing the horse to stumble and fall over a cliff, or causing an angel to block the way and having a donkey speak, etc.

Robert writes, "The open theist limits God’s knowledge of facts to only facts about the past and the present."

Incorrect, though it depends on how one defines "facts" and so different kinds of open theists would address this issue differently. I think that the more defensible type of open theism states that the "facts" that God knows about the future consist of "might / might not" propositions rather than "will / will not" propositions in relation to causally free choices. His knowledge of his own actions consists of "will / will not", and his knowledge of future physical states of the universe depends on how you conceptualize the quantum nature of the universe.

So, regarding your example of the game, God's knowledge of you future attendance consists of "Robert might or might not go to the game". God knows what he will and will not do if Robert goes to the game and what he will
and will not do if Robert does not go to the game. If it is important to God that Robert not go to the game, then God will cause circumstances to exist that will prevent Robert from going to the game.

regards,
#John

Hello John (part 2), “Some open theists argue tha...

2009-12-03T16:59:00.085-05:00

Hello John (part 2),

“Some open theists argue that the outcome of a future causally free choice is by definition not knowable.”

It is only unknowable “by definition” if you define it that way (truth by definition). And again that is not very persuasive in light of God’s past track record about knowing future events as presented in the bible.

“However, other open theists would argue that future casually free choices can be known but that the relationship of knowing is different for such future choices as compared to past choices or currently occuring or existing things / actions.”

Not sure what you mean here. The open theists that I know and have read believe that God cannot know and does not know “future causally free choices.” They deny God’s foreknowledge and keep libertarian free will.

“This second group of open theists would argue that God's knowledge of the past and present is definite (has occurred, is occurring), but that His knowledge of the future is not expressed by a will / will not contradiction.”

But with for example my going or not going to that game, I either will or will not go.

“The nature of His knowledge of the future is expressed by might / might not.”
I don’t buy that at all. Again it is wrong to say about my going to the game on Friday night that either I might or might not (I either will or will not).

“Anyway, bottom line of my point is that your definition of knowledge is the same as the open theists in that you both agree that God knows "everything", and that God can only know what can be known, and things that cannot be known do not count against His omniscience.”

We don’t agree, the open theist denies that God knows the future (while I say that he does).

“So, God finds out what a person actually does do, what the person actually choose in real time.”

He can only “find out” if he did not know. I say he knew, he does not “find out” once we do something (he knows we will do it before we do it).

“BTW, I'm a "presentist" and believe in the A series of time. I believe that only the present exists and that neither the past nor the future exist as physcal entities.”

WE may experience only the present, that may be our experience. But I believe that God transcends time, He is beyond time and space. His relation to time is different than ours.

“The future, of course, does not exist in that sense (i.e., the past sense) unless one views God's relationship to time and dimensionality differently.”
The future may not exist for us, and again I would suggest that we do not directly experience the “future”, rather we experience a series of consecutive “presents”. But the future is known to God though it has not yet occurred for us. God already knows if I am going to that game on Friday night (or not). But the present of Friday night has not yet been experienced by me.

Robert

Hello John, (part 1) “God cannot know that 2 + 2 ...

2009-12-03T16:57:43.188-05:00

Hello John, (part 1)

“God cannot know that 2 + 2 = 7. Such a thing is nonsensical. The same with knowing the future.”

I disagree with your reasoning here. 2 + 2 = 7 is a logical impossibility in our present world because 2 + 2 = 4, not 7. God knows all facts such as that 2 + 2 = 4 (2 + 2 = 7 is a not a fact, not a reality in the history of this universe). But knowing the future is not the same as knowing something that is false or a logical impossibility.

I am considering going to a playoff high school football game on Friday night (a semifinal between two extremely good local teams, one team is in fact 12-0). If I end up going to the game then it is a fact, a fact that is a part of this world history that I went to that game. If I end up not going to the game then it is a fact, a fact that is part of this world history that I did not go to that game. Either way, one of those events will in fact occur, once of those events will be a fact. God knowing the future knows which of those two possibilities will be an actuality and will be a fact of world history. I say God can and does know those kinds of things (open theists deny this). My claim that he knows which possibility will be the actual event is nothing close to knowing that 2 + 2 = 7.

“Some open theists argue that knowing with certainty what a libertarian free willed person will do is nonsensical, and therefore not something that can constitute knowledge.”

Why is it “nonsensical” if God has done it already before? It is not as if the bible contains no examples of God knowing a future event involving human choices.

“if something does not constitute knowledge, it cannot be known; if it does, it can. So, for example, both you and the open theist would agree that 2 + 2 = 5 does not constitute knowledge and so cannot be know.”

2 + 2 = 5 cannot be known because it is not a fact, it is a logical impossibility. But me going or not going to the game on Friday night is not a logical impossibility and one of those two possibilities is going to be actualized and become a fact Friday night.

“That is to say, both you and the open theist agree that God's knowledge is unlimited in the sense that whatever can be known by God is known by him.”

No, the open theist limits God’s knowledge to facts about the past and the present (not facts about the future, such as whether or not I am going to that game on Friday night!).

“The difference is that you and open theists disagree over what constitutes a knowable thing.”

I say that God knows all facts, including facts in the future. The open theist limits God’s knowledge of facts to only facts about the past and the present.

Robert

Re Robert's comment on Dec. 1 at 1:04 a.m. whe...

2009-12-01T12:09:06.701-05:00

Re Robert's comment on Dec. 1 at 1:04 a.m. where he wrote, "I also believe that open theists are mistaken, the bible properly interpreted does not present God as not knowing the future."

Many open theists believe that God does know the future and that he does know it exhaustively. However, they argue that God knows future causally free choices as might/might nots rather than will/will nots.

Because God's knowledge of knowable things is exhaustive, and because He is infinite, He can devote "all" of his attention on each of the (seemingly) infinite number of might/might nots and decide on His response to each one. God's responses to the might/might nots are directed toward achieving with certainty the ends that He wishes to attain.

Under that view, God is never surprised in the sense that He learns (goes from not-knowledge to knowledge) about some possibility that never before occurred to Him.

The only thing that changes in respect of God's knowledge is that something that was known as a might/might not becomes known to Him as a "is doing" in the present and a "did" in the past.

So, God finds out what a person actually does do, what the person actually choose in real time. But God has already known from before creation what He (God) would do if that choice was made and has always had His response prepared.

BTW, I'm a "presentist" and believe in the A series of time. I believe that only the present exists and that neither the past nor the future exist as physcal entities. The past only exists as "memories" in the minds of humans or God and in the mechanical nature of the present physicality if we assume that the past operated mechanically at a physical level (e.g., the car is now rolling down the hill in the present because in the past someone made a car and put it at the top of the hill without brakes on). That is, the physical past exists in the sense that it is the basis for what physically exists now.

The future, of course, does not exist in that sense (i.e., the past sense) unless one views God's relationship to time and dimensionality differently.

regards,
#John

Re Robert, Dec. 1, 1:02 R writes, "The bible...

2009-12-01T11:49:32.205-05:00

Re Robert, Dec. 1, 1:02

R writes, "The bible does not limit God’s knowledge to “all that can be known”, that is what open theists claim. The bible seems to claim that instead God knows everything."

This issue is, "what is 'everything'?"

God cannot know that 2 + 2 = 7. Such a thing is nonsensical. The same with knowing the future. Some open theists argue that knowing with certainty what a libertarian free willed person will do is nonsensical, and therefore not something that can constitute knowledge. If something cannot constitute knowledge, it cannot be known. Consequently, your definition of knowledge and the open theists' definition of knowledge are the same in terms of the nature or ontology (?) of knowledge: if something does not constitute knowledge, it cannot be known; if it does, it can. So, for example, both you and the open theist would agree that 2 + 2 = 5 does not constitute knowledge and so cannot be know.

That is to say, both you and the open theist agree that God's knowledge is unlimited in the sense that whatever can be known by God is known by him.

The difference is that you and open theists disagree over what constitutes a knowable thing.

Some open theists argue that the outcome of a future causally free choice is by definition not knowable. However, other open theists would argue that future casually free choices can be known but that the relationship of knowing is different for such future choices as compared to past choices or currently occuring or existing things / actions.

This second group of open theists would argue that God's knowledge of the past and present is definite (has occurred, is occurring), but that His knowledge of the future is not expressed by a will / will not contradiction. The nature of His knowledge of the future is expressed by might / might not. On this view the bivalence of truth is maintained (true, not true) but the opposition of contradiction is between "might/might not" vs. "will/will not". "Will" and "will not" are then contraries, not contradictories.

Anyway, bottom line of my point is that your definition of knowledge is the same as the open theists in that you both agree that God knows "everything", and that God can only know what can be known, and things that cannot be known do not count against His omniscience.

regards,
#John

Hello John (part 2), “I'm not committed to an...

2009-12-01T01:04:22.418-05:00

Hello John (part 2),

“I'm not committed to any one explanation of how that goes together. Of the three free will explanations, I think that one of the varieties of open theism is most likely correct, then simple foreknowledge and then Molinism as least likely.”

I think that simple foreknowledge proponents make some valid points as do proponents of Molinism. I also believe that open theists are mistaken, the bible properly interpreted does not present God as not knowing the future.

“So, I think it likely that God has determined that a number of things will come to pass, but that He has not determined a number of other things, nor has he in some respects not yet fully determined how some of the things that will come to pass are going to be brought about. As a lame example, God may have determined that Jane will be saved from cancer, but has not determined yet who will pray for her or if He will just give her remission.”

OK now is where it gets interesting. I also believe that God determines some things and some things result from our exercise of libertarian free will (both good and bad things come from our freely made choices). The calvinist determinist is one extreme: that God predetermines everything. The deist is the other extreme: that God created the world and now never intervenes or gets involved with it. What is between calvinistic determinism and deism? A world that involves both God sometimes determining events unilaterally AND a world where we sometimes have libertarian free will. And if the world is a combination of some determined events and some freely chosen events, then the world is not a Fully Determinate World (but instead a partially determinate world).

“So, I don't think that fully determined worlds are the most likely option, but I'm not ruling them out. I'm open to being convinced.”

I do not believe that God considers various FDW’s and then selects the one that he wants from among the set of possible and feasible FDW’s. Instead, I believe that God creates the **type of world** that he wants. A world with certain features that he wants (e.g., a world where humans sometimes have and make their own choices).

While I am not an open theist and am convinced it is a mistake, I do believe that many determinists caricature open theism and do not fairly represent it at all. Example, they will argue that the God of open theism “gets surprised sometimes since he does not know the future”. That is false. If the open theist believes that God knows the past exhaustively as well as the present then how is God going to be surprised by some action that we do? If he knows the present then he will know what options we are thinking about in our minds, and though he may not know which option we will select he knows what options we were thinking about before we selected one of them. John if I knew all of your thoughts right now and all of the options what you were considering, and then you picked one of them, how would I be surprised by any option that you select? I may not like them or have preferred that you chose differently, but surprise, I don’ think so.

Anyway sorry about the delay in responding to you, consider that I have now started rolling the ball again.

Robert

Hello John, (part 1) Sorry that I did not respond...

2009-12-01T01:02:15.829-05:00

Hello John, (part 1)

Sorry that I did not respond to you sooner, but you happened to post at one of my two favorite holidays (Thanksgiving = I have a lot to be thankful for and was spending some quality time with friends and family over the last few days, so blogging was not much of a priority at that time, hope you understand).

“Robert, all I did on Triablogue was cut and paste my posts from J. Taylor's blog so that I could have the debate directly on their site.”

That’s it, you got banned for merely disagreeing with Hays? Hays may be the worst example of a nasty Internet calvinist blogger that I am aware of.

“On Zimmerman. He rejects Molinism, but not (in the article) for the grounding objection. He presents an argument that Molinism effectively destroys relevant freewill by being deterministic(like Calvinism) in a manner that is incompatible with morally and causally relevant free will.”

If that is his argument I think he has a point, it seems to me that both Molinists and calvinists when they claim that God chooses from among Fully Determinate Worlds, which one he wants to actualize. That in actualizing the one FDW that makes things completely predetermined and so does things become too deterministic.

“Whether I believe in FDWs

Romans is pretty that even the unsaved have accurate moral intuitions: Romans 2:2:15 They show that the work of the law is written in their hearts, as their conscience bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or else defend them, 2:16 on the day when God will judge the secrets of human hearts, according to my gospel through Christ Jesus.

One of our moral intuitions is that we are morally responsible because our wills are causally free, that is not determined by someone or something outside of ourselves, nor by our own physical and spiritual make-up, i.e., that we could have done otherwise than we did.”

Good points arguing that we sometimes have libertarian free will.

“One thing that I am completely convinced of in this regard is that Calvinism is very very wrong.”

You got that right! :-)

“As to what is right, I am committed only to what the Bible states: God knows all that can be known, He places real choices before us, we can freely choose.”

The bible does not limit God’s knowledge to “all that can be known”, that is what open theists claim. The bible seems to claim that instead God knows everything.

So we agree that we sometimes have libertarian free will but disagree about the extent of God’s knowledge.

Robert

Whether I believe in FDWs Romans is pretty...

2009-11-26T09:50:23.453-05:00

Whether I believe in FDWs

Romans is pretty that even the unsaved have accurate moral intuitions: Romans 2:2:15 They show that the work of the law is written in their hearts, as their conscience bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or else defend them, 2:16 on the day when God will judge the secrets of human hearts, according to my gospel through Christ Jesus.

One of our moral intuitions is that we are morally responsible because our wills are causally free, that is not determined by someone or something outside of ourselves, nor by our own physical and spiritual make-up, i.e., that we could have done otherwise than we did.

One thing that I am completely convinced of in this regard is that Calvinism is very very wrong. As to what is right, I am committed only to what the Bible states: God knows all that can be known, He places real choices before us, we can freely choose.

I'm not committed to any one explanation of how that goes together. Of the three free will explanations, I think that one of the varieties of open theism is most likely correct, then simple foreknowledge and then Molinism as least likely.

So, I think it likely that God has determined that a number of things will come to pass, but that He has not determined a number of other things, nor has he in some respects not yet fully determined how some of the things that will come to pass are going to be brought about. As a lame example, God may have determined that Jane will be saved from cancer, but has not determined yet who will pray for her or if He will just give her remission.

So, I don't think that fully determined worlds are the most likely option, but I'm not ruling them out. I'm open to being convinced.

regards,
#John

Robert, all I did on Triablogue was cut and paste ...

2009-11-25T10:40:06.127-05:00

Robert, all I did on Triablogue was cut and paste my posts from J. Taylor's blog so that I could have the debate directly on their site. I didn't know how Taylor would perceive (or care) about how the debate was going, and I thought that Hays would be open to holding the same debate on his own blog.

On Zimmerman. He rejects Molinism, but not (in the article) for the grounding objection. He presents an argument that Molinims effectively destroys relevant freewill by being deterministic(like Calvinism) in a manner that is incompatible with morally and causally relevant free will.

I know that I'm not conversant with all the latest literature on the topic, but I found his set up a bit long and for a long time I wasn't sure where he was going. It wasn't until the conclusion that it started to make sense.

I'll respond to your other question later.

regards,
#John

Hello John, “Yes it does, Robert. Thanks for your...

2009-11-24T19:13:40.295-05:00

Hello John,

“Yes it does, Robert. Thanks for your post. I'm interested in continuing to dialogue on whatever thread you take up next (or this one). I see that there is now a new lead post on the grounding objection to Molinism / middle knowledge. Are you going there next? Is this thread exhausted?”

Why should this thread be exhausted when I want to know whether or not you believe that God creates Fully Determinate Worlds (FDW’s)?? :-)

“BTW, I was over at Justin Taylor's blog, where he had a post (a video) of Sproul . . . .”

Yeh, I posted on that thread as well.

I noticed you and Hays got into quite a long prolonged discussion there as well.

“Anyway, this guy steve hays, who I learned blogs at Triablogue, started responding to my posts. I experience the same sort of thing that you describe: the other person misquotes me or attributes to me beliefs that I don't hold or has no clue what basic definitions in the field are. It was very frustrating.”

Hays is a not a good person to have discussions with. He will constantly and repeatedly create false representations of what others are saying. Another habit he has is to argue against you by using his own premises, things he believes, things that come out of his calvin-ism and injecting them into your view pretending that you hold them as well and then attacking that.

Example –in your discussion with Hays over at Justin’s, Hays kept arguing that based upon “libertarian premises” there must be a possible world/a FDW that God could create, where everybody freely chooses to believe in Jesus. But this thinking that God considers various FDW’s/possible worlds and then selects one of them to be the world that he wants **is** Molinism and Calvinism. It is the Molinists and Calvinists that believe that God selects from various FDW’s. But if you hold to libertarian free will, you may believe that a world where we have real choices is not going to be a Fully Determinate World. So you will reject this thinking held by Molinists and Calvinists that God selects one **determinate** world that is fully determined. For Hays to then come in and claim that proponents of LFW hold to FDW’s (as he does), and then argue that that is the thinking of all non-Calvinists who hold to LFW is dishonest. He knows better and yet keeps doing so.

“So I went over to Triablogue where Hays had posted a comment about the above thread at Taylor's blog. So I made comments and used the same arguments I was using at Taylor's blog. Triablogue banned me that very day and deleted all my posts.”

Did you use profanity? Did you make inappropriate personal attacks? What did you do?

If you merely disagreed with Hays about calvinism and got banned for THAT, that would be sad but not surprising coming from the Triablogue group.

“Robert, given your views re Molinism, you would likely enjoy the following paper: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University), "Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument" . . . .”

Thanks for the recommendation, I already knew of this paper. But it is so long (90 pages) that I had not yet read it.

“I meant to add that Zimmerman makes an argument against Molinism that is very similar to the one you make.”

Please tell me: how is Zimmerman making a similar argument as I am making?

Robert

I posted too soon, I meant to add that Zimmerman m...

2009-11-24T13:14:41.889-05:00

I posted too soon, I meant to add that Zimmerman makes an argument against Molinism that is very similar to the one you make.

regards,
#John

Robert, given your views re Molinism, you would li...

2009-11-24T13:12:33.921-05:00

Robert, given your views re Molinism, you would likely enjoy the following paper: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University), "Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument" at http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/Anti-Molinist-Arg-Jan-25.pdf

I'm not sure what your level of knowledge of philosophy is. I found it heavy going, but reading the conclusion helped me understand where he was going and to figure out what he was saying.

regards,
#John

Yes it does, Robert. Thanks for your post. I'm...

2009-11-24T13:06:24.724-05:00

Yes it does, Robert. Thanks for your post. I'm interested in continuing to dialogue on whatever thread you take up next (or this one). I see that there is now a new lede post on the grounding objection to Molinism / middle knowledge. Are you going there next? Is this thread exhausted?

BTW, I was over at Justin Taylor's blog, where he had a post (a video) of Sproul answering the question of whether God really wants to save everyone:
http://thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/justintaylor/2009/11/18/does-god-really-want-all-people-to-be-saved/#comments

Anyway, this guy steve hays, who I learned blogs at Triablogue, started responding to my posts. I experience the same sort of thing that you describe: the other person misquotes me or attributes to me beliefs that I don't hold or has no clue what basic definitions in the field are. It was very frustrating.

So I went over to Triablogue where Hays had posted a comment about the above thread at Taylor's blog. So I made comments and used the same arguments I was using at Taylor's blog. Triablogue banned me that very day and deleted all my posts. I guess they can't handle someone showing that they don't know what they claim to.

regards,
#John

Hello John, (part 2) Recently I have had one cal...

2009-11-23T13:51:01.941-05:00

Hello John, (part 2)

Recently I have had one calvinist in particular, a guy with a real lack of character, repeatedly attempt to argue with me by taking premises that **he holds** and then putting them on me as if I believe them and then arguing against my view using HIS PREMISES!! He will argue that God could have created a “possible world” in which everyone is saved if he wanted to.

Well the problem that should be immediately obvious with this claim is that it involves the notion of God creating a FDW, a notion that I reject.

Now he as a calvinist holds to this notion (he does in fact believe that God considers multiple FDW’s and then chooses to actualize the one FDW that he wants, so everything is determined, everything is predetermined and goes according to God’s supposed total plan/secret plan/sovereign plan).

But that is calvinism ***not*** my view.

So to take a notion that I reject, that comes straight out of his view, and then try to claim that my view involves his notion, is dishonest (because I have repeatedly said I don’t hold his premises and do not appreciate it when he takes his premises and puts them on me; he is in effect creating a false representation, a straw man of my view by using HIS OWN PREMISES to attack my view, again that is not honest).

So John I don’t accept this idea that God surveys possible FDW’s and then chooses the one that he wants to actualize which becomes the actual world we find ourselves in. I do not believe that God creates a Fully Determinate World where everything is “fixed” by Him beforehand. That thinking may be held by both calvinists and Molinists, but it is not held by me. And again I believe that if God creates a world where we sometimes have LFW (as we do in this present world), then by its very nature this world is not a Fully Determinate World. The actual world that we find ourselves in does seem to include a mix of events determined by God and events determined by us. As such it is not a FDW. So while I hold LFW and the idea that God has middle knowledge in common with a Molinist, I do not hold in common their view of how God creates the actual world (which for them is this present FDW) from among various FDW’s that God considers. It seems to me that both calvinists and molinists are operating with this FDW premise, but I don’t! :-)

Does that answer your question John?

Robert

Hello John, (part 1) You quoted me as saying: &...

2009-11-23T13:48:12.631-05:00

Hello John, (part 1)

You quoted me as saying:

"God knows everything including the future and future events involving freely chosen actions, that God knows what would have occurred if different choices were made, e.g. David at Keilah being a clear example, that God knows all possibilities and all actualities as well"

And then responded with:

“That, to me, indicates Molinism and so I'm not sure why Robert does not consider that set of beliefs to be Molinism. Perhaps, Robert, you could explain why?”

Notice carefully what I intentionally left out: the claim that God considers many “possible worlds” (each representing a Fully Determinate World where every detail is predecided by God, or predetermined by God) and then he chooses which of these Fully Determinate Worlds (FDW’s for short) to actualize, which then becomes the one actual world that we find ourselves in. It seems to me that both calvinism and Molinism hold this premise or idea, or assumption, that God selects one FDW from among various FDW’s that he is considering in eternity. My problem with this is that if these worlds are really fully determinate then I do not see them as containing libertarian free will. Or put another way, if the world history sometimes has events involving LFW then it is NOT a FDW. It seems to me that a FDW and a world where LFW sometimes exists are contraries (if you have one then you cannot have the other).

What this means is that in my view (and I am neither a calvinist nor a Molinist) since God decides to create a world where LFW is sometimes present, that he is then NOT creating a FDW. It also appears to me that both calvinism and Molinism hold to the FDW concept. I have even seen some calvinists argue againts Molinism by arguing that if the world is a FDW then it will not, cannot contain LFW (e.g. if all events are foreknown by God then LFW is excluded is one of their arguments). So I reject the FDW concept and instead believe that God creates an actual world with certain design features. In this one actual world some events involve LFW and some events involve determinate events (e.g. sin involves LFW, the second coming of Jesus is determinate involving a unilateral action of God).

Robert

The various views of open theism differ substantiv...

2009-11-19T23:58:23.615-05:00

The various views of open theism differ substantively in how they describe the content and nature of God's knowledge of the future, though of course they all agree that the future is contingent and causally open. Some, such as Sanders, argue that future events do not constitute knowledge and thus do not impinge upon omniscience. Others argue that future events do constitute knowledge, but that the nature of the knowledge depends on whether the future events are "will be" or "might be". Etc.

I say that Allah and the god described by Calvinism are weak and fearful because they can only deal with and actualize one particular future, the future they decree. They cannot take in the infinite amount of information represented by a contingent future and libertarian freewill, nor can they manage all the decisions that they would have to make pre-creation were libertarian free-will true. Furthermore, they cannot handle giving humans libertarian free will as they possess, nor could they accomplish their will if they did so give it.

Open theism, on the other hand, posits a God that has the capacity to know an infinite number of possible futures; the knowledge, wisdom and power to know and decide what to do with respect to each possible future; the ability to bring His entire focus and power and knowledge to bear on each of the possibilities; and the confidence, wisdom and power to bring about what He wills despite giving humans libertarian free will.

regards,
#John

Of course I mean to say their view of Allah has gr...

2009-11-19T19:04:47.751-05:00

Of course I mean to say their view of Allah has greater knowledge and power than your view of God.

John, Going over chioce and responsibility seems ...

2009-11-19T18:58:40.472-05:00

John,

Going over chioce and responsibility seems like a reasonable approach.

But you're view of Allah as impotent due to fear surly is derived from mixing your view and theirs. Using such a mix to limit Allah's knowledge and power seems wrong. I believe it remains fair to say Allah has more knowledge and power than God does in your view.

God be with you,
Dan

John, Are these differences substanative or just ...

2009-11-19T18:43:50.822-05:00

John,

Are these differences substanative or just semantic?

God be with you,
Dan

In case it is not evident from my comments thusfar...

2009-11-19T13:02:40.434-05:00

In case it is not evident from my comments thusfar,some criticisms of open theism pertain only to some versions of open theism (e.g., the charge that open theism diminishes God by denying that God knows all truths, or the charge that open theism denies exhaustive foreknowledge). Such charges, if made, should be made in respect of a particular model of open theism and should not be generalized to open theism as a whole.

regards,
#John

turizRe Dan at 7:45 on the 18th I would respond i...

2009-11-19T11:26:04.374-05:00

turizRe Dan at 7:45 on the 18th

I would respond in some ways the same way that I would respond to a Calvinist, and in some ways different, if I were responding on this issue and not on something more directly related to evangelism.

As for "same" I would talk about the impossibility of moral responsibility without a contingent future, and I would go to Old Testament passages that show God demonstrating through words and actions that a contingent future (as a result of libertarian free will) is necessary for moral responsibility and the morality of meting out justice.

As for different, I would not have to overcome the Calvinist belief that their system is Christian and underpins the gospel.

I see the Calvinist and Muslim god as knowing the least of all, and being the weakest, most impotent and timid, as well as the most unjust, of all the perspectives on God.

In the contingent futurist view that I believe is most tenable, God knows everything that will definately happen and everything that might or might not happen and from all eternity has prepared a response to each. Furthermore, where God intends to have something specific happen (which is rare) He will intervene to the degree necessary to make that event happen. If such intervention includes overriding someone's otherwise free choice, then he will do that (though it seems doubtful that he does so), even though such an override means that He cannot hold the person morally or otherwise responsible for that action.

The Calvinist and Moslem god can only what He decrees and is too weak and uncertain of Himself to embue humans with the same freedom of contingent future that He Himself possesses.

regards,
#John